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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Johari Efendi 
 
Master of Arts 
 
Conflict and Dispute Resolution Program 
 
June 2013 
 
Title: Civic Engagement and Collaborative Governance in Post-Conflict Societies: Case 
Study, Ambon, Indonesia 
 
 
This study analyzes how civic engagement and collaborative governance can be 
used to build peace in post-conflict societies. A case study approach is used to examine 
the presence of civic engagement as a precursor to collaborative governance in the 
reconstruction of segregated areas in post-conflict Ambon, Indonesia. The study 
evaluates the effective ways that people were engaged in the multiple processes of 
reconstruction and assesses the readiness of Ambon to apply collaborative governance in 
current affairs.  It finds that collaborative governance can be applied to public policy 
processes in segregated societies in post-conflict and can promote inter-society 
engagement. This study suggests that governments and NGOs in post-conflict areas could 
use a collaborative governance approach to sustain peace in post-conflict areas.  The 
conclusions recognize that integrating collaborative governance into peace building 
programs is a crucial element of the peace building process in post-conflict areas, 
creating a greater likelihood for sustainable peace.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis derives from the question, how does civic engagement pave the way 
for collaborative governance processes in post-conflict societies? Specifically, I examine 
the post-conflict society of Ambon, in Indonesia. In the process of answering this 
question, this thesis evaluates the Ambon public policy process based on if and how they 
have engaged people participation, and the readiness of Ambon to apply collaborative 
governance.  Since there are limitations to the literature that relates to the thesis topic and 
the unique characteristics and conditions of post-conflict areas in Indonesia, the literature 
review section of this thesis ends with a hybridized model of civic engagement and 
collaborative governance that specifically applies to post-conflict areas. The model is 
then used to evaluate the public policy process and civic engagement in Ambon city, in 
the aftermath of prolonged and intractable conflict.  
Background 
 
Indonesia is a country famous for its ethnic and religious diversity. While this 
diversity can also be considered one of the great strengths of Indonesia, it has been cause 
for great conflict. According to the United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian 
Recovery (UNSFIR), from 1990 until 2003, collective violence in Indonesia caused more 
than 10,700 deaths, 43% of which were caused by ethnic conflict and 57% caused by 
religious conflict (Varshney, Panggabean & Tadjoeddin, 2004). Data from the Konferensi 
Wali Gereja Indonesia (KWI), the Conference of Indonesian Bishops, and from the 
Bakubae peace movement, show data of 18,910 people dying between October 1998 to 
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September 2001 (Malik, 2007). The period between 1997 to 2003 recorded the highest 
tension of ethnic and religious conflicts in Indonesia, and included conflicts in West 
Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, North Maluku, and Maluku 
provinces. However, those areas are not experiencing conflict anymore. All of the former 
conflict areas have now become post-conflict areas, although this change does not mean 
that those areas have zero violence, or are free from the potential of relapsing into 
conflict.  
Some ethnic and religious conflicts ended with peace agreements between 
conflicting parties, many of which were facilitated by the government. For example, the 
Poso conflict ended with the Malino I peace agreement in 2000, and the Ambon conflict 
ended with the Malino II peace agreement in 2002. Others ended naturally, without peace 
agreements. After several years, all post-conflict areas in Indonesia are in similar 
situations, where the sources of conflicts have not been addressed properly and therefore 
tensions remain. Peace agreements between conflicting parties are often regarded as 
historical documents for ending the violence, but have not been incorporated into the 
policy of local governments. The agreements have not always served to create new ways 
of framing relationships among conflicting parties, or served to guide public policy 
processes in post-conflict areas. People are often reluctant to talk about past conflicts, due 
to sensitivity about the issues and painful memories. The problem is that reconstruction 
processes, resettlement of refugees, and reconciliation are not yet fully finished. Local 
governments are anxious to return to normal activities, and put their focus on 
development, infrastructure and economic improvements. Issues of peacebuilding are not 
always a priority for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and they focus their 
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efforts on the issues that concerned them before conflict happened: environment, 
community development, women and children, and health.  
One of the real and obvious effects of conflict that remains in all post-conflict 
areas in Indonesia is segregation according to religions and/or ethnicities. Some areas had 
historic segregation between communities before any conflict happened, such as on 
Ambon Island. However, after conflicts happened, the segregation was worse than 
before. Geographical segregation occurred and increased while conflicts persisted, and 
continued after the overt conflicts ended because of security and safety reasons. People 
moved and then stayed in their same religious or ethnic communities. Most places had 
been vibrant and tolerant mixed communities, but then became segregated. Geographic 
segregation clearly separated communities. All members of communities know the 
borders well, and they can easily draw the segregation lines. They also know who are 
members of their communities, and who are not.  
While segregation in the short term brings safety and security to the communities, 
in the longer term, it creates mistrust among communities. Geographic segregation can 
decrease conflict incidents because it takes more effort for conflicting parties to reach and 
attack other parties’ areas.  Geographic segregation among communities in post-conflict 
areas can stimulate economic, educational, and social segregation. In Indonesia, 
segregation caused informal markets to emerge within internal communities. According 
to Adam (2008), informal market activities arose in segregated communities during and 
after conflict as creative strategies for refugees to survive in insecure situations. Informal 
markets in internal communities lead to people not needing to go to other communities to 
buy goods. Their children did not need to go to other communities for study, because 
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schools were created within each community. Increased segregation became more 
apparent when the government’s policies for refugee resettlement did not force people 
back to their former place to maintain the mix of communities. Moreover, properties left 
by refugees have not been clearly handled, and have become sensitive issues that can lead 
to and/or trigger new conflicts. There have been no government or NGO programs to 
address or reconcile property disputes in post-conflict areas of Indonesia. 
In segregated areas, small accidents can lead to large issues and rumors are easily 
triggers for riots and relapses in conflict because there is mistrust among communities. 
For instance, because a ojeg driver (motorcycle taxi driver) from the Muslim community 
died in a Christian community on September 11, 2011, a riot was started in Ambon city, 
where eight people died, others were wounded, more than 300 houses were burned and 
more than four thousands people became refugees (International Crisis Group, 2011). 
Even though the peace agreement for the Ambon conflict had been signed nine years 
before, the segregation could be seen through the way refugees evacuated according to 
religion. Muslim refugees sheltered in Muslim communities and Christian refugees 
stayed in Christian communities. There were no refugee’s shelters in which refugees 
from both communities could stay together.    
Reconciliation is a natural process that results from the gradual rebuilding of trust. 
However, encounters with former adversaries, bridging communication and engagement 
among different and diverse communities can stimulate the building of trust among 
divided communities. Varshney (2002) suggests that inter-community civic engagement 
can lead to peace. Creating circumstances that encourage inter-group civic engagement in 
post-conflict areas will help post-conflict areas create and sustain peace.  
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One characteristic of religious and ethnic conflicts in Indonesia is that they are 
typically horizontal, which means that the conflict occurs among different ethnic or 
religious communities (Snitwongse & Thompson, 2005, p. 3). In horizontal conflict, the 
government is not seen as a part of the conflict. In some conflict and post-conflict areas 
in Indonesia, district and provincial offices are neutral zones, which means they are 
accessible to people from different communities. People in conflict areas also rely on 
local government, especially for emergency response, because the government provides 
emergency aid for refugees, and for rehabilitation and reconstruction processes after 
conflict. Therefore, local governments are important actors in sustaining peace in 
horizontal post-conflict areas. 
Despite their importance, local governments are often considered relatively 
neutral in horizontal communal conflicts in Indonesia. The roles that local governments 
play post-conflict are more complicated than the roles played by local governments in 
non-conflict areas. In the areas where communities are segregated, every single public 
policy issued by government will be interpreted differently by the different groups within 
that segregated society. When the local government builds public facilities in one 
particular community area, it raises questions and issues for other communities about 
why the building took place in that area (and not in the other area). For instance, in 2005, 
when Ambon city initiated building a new bus terminal and center of economic activities 
in Paso, which is famous as a Christian area, people from Muslim communities felt 
resentful. Not surprisingly, the Christian communities fully supported the Ambon city 
initiative (Pariela, 2007). The government’s public policies, and the public policy 
processes in post-conflict circumstances, can create tension between different 
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communities and can widen segregation and mistrust among conflicting communities. 
However, the public policy process might have potential to promote peace and support 
the peacebuilding process when the process involves stakeholders from different 
communities. Such stakeholder involvement can facilitate trust-building, and channel 
constructive communication that reengages communities.  
In Ambon city, within the Maluku province, there have been many local and 
national initiatives that have attempted to force social engagement, reconciliation, and 
trust-building among communities. Many peace trainings, peace workshops, and 
peacebuilding initiatives have been conducted by local, national, and international NGOs 
in Ambon. Some engagement between segregated communities has been done through 
cultural events, sports, women’s activities, and youth events. The Ministry of Social 
Affairs also initiated a social cohesion program that built infrastructure, which involved 
different communities. The United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Peace 
Through Development (PTD) initiative facilitated consultative planning meetings 
(Musyawarah Rencana Pembangunan), which added with conflict-sensitive elements. 
However, all activities mostly used program approaches, which were effective while the 
program was being implemented, but which stopped when the programs were done. 
Ambonese need social engagement activities that extend beyond mere programs. 
The segregation among communities still remains, even though the situation is 
slowly improving. People from different communities can enter other communities 
during the day, although many prefer not to enter other communities during the night. 
Transportation connections between different communities and the markets are accessible 
to all people, but people are still afraid to enter other communities. In some areas, they 
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still have their own markets in their own communities. Students from elementary school, 
junior high school, and high school still study in their own communities. Yet, in Ambon, 
from the time the peace agreement was signed in 2002 until 2011, there were two big 
conflict incidents that took place, one on April 25, 2004 and the other on September 11, 
2011 (International Crisis Group, 2004 and 2011).  
Ambonese need more efforts and strategies to facilitate inter-group civic 
engagement, social integration, and the reduction of social segregation among different 
communities. Civic engagement has to become a way of life for Ambonese through 
activities related and close to their daily life, including in the public policy process. There 
is a need for integrative and collaborative work between NGOs, communities, and 
government to sustain peace in post-conflict areas.  
Currently, collaborative governance has become a popular trend in government 
agencies and among scholars of public process in the US. The collaborative governance 
approach, which brings all stakeholders involved in an issue together to define the 
problem and co-create solutions, can help parties find better and more lasting solutions 
than any single party can do (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). Collaborative governance 
processes require the active participation of stakeholders –– including everyday people, 
along with representatives from the private sector and from government agencies. Active 
participation results in contact and communication among different stakeholders, which 
is important for building inter-group civic engagement.   
However, the concept of collaborative governance has grown in stable and 
developed countries such as The United States and New Zealand. Those countries have 
relatively stable democratic systems and legal systems. The question is how well this 
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concept applies in developing countries such as Indonesia, where the political and legal 
systems are still working toward stability, and where there are post-conflict areas and 
issues. Collaborative governance gives more possibilities for civic involvement or civic 
engagement in public policy process, which means bringing people from different 
backgrounds together to engage.  
There is not much literature that talks about the civic engagement in post-conflict 
areas. But even though there isn’t much, there is some literature that focuses on post-
conflict areas, although that literature mostly talks about inter-state ethnic conflict or 
separation conflict rather than intra-state post-conflict like many cases in Indonesia. For 
instance, The United Nations (UN) has produced documents about strategies of 
reconstruction and reconciliation for post-conflict areas that have had experiences with 
inter-state ethnic conflict. One of the focuses from the UN for post-conflict areas is in the 
government sector, where the UN suggests the practice of good governance and capacity 
building for government in order to increase civic participation in government. Moreover, 
literature about civic engagement mostly focuses on engaging people with government 
rather than considering the issues that pertain in post-conflict areas.  
In contrast, resources about collaborative governance are developing and 
expanding. It can be seen in many different fields, including public policy management, 
environment management and conflict resolution. However, there is extremely limited 
literature available about collaborative governance in post-conflict areas.  
Significance of the Study 
 
Since this research evaluates and analyzes the presence of civic engagement and 
the readiness of Ambonese to apply collaborative governance approaches to public policy 
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decision making in Ambon city as one of the post-conflict areas in Indonesia, the 
research will show the civic engagement process, pattern, strength and weakness in 
public policy process in Ambon. Through those things, this research hopes to give insight 
for local government, NGOs, and people in Ambon to find strategy to minimize negative 
impact of public policy processes on sustaining peace in the Ambon area. Moreover, this 
research specifically will help local NGOs, local government, and civil societies in 
Ambon, to find ways to effectively use public policy processes as instruments to 
encourage inter-group civic engagement.  
Indonesia has huge ethnic and religious diversity that creates the potential for 
segregated, disintegrative, and fragmented communities. If the diversity is not managed 
properly, it can lead to conflict rather than peace in Indonesia. Moreover, all post-conflict 
areas in Indonesia have the same crucial problems of segregated communities, a situation 
that can be aggravated by public policy processes that can lead to a relapse of conflict. 
This research sketches the potential for employing public policy processes as a way to 
encourage inter-group civic engagement through collaborative governance approaches. 
Therefore, this research can be an essential reference document for decision makers, 
including national and international NGOs, to prevent conflict and sustain peace in post-
conflict areas in Indonesia through public policy processes.  
Since research and literature about civic engagement in public policy processes, 
and the practice of collaborative governance in post-conflict societies are scarce, this 
research may provide a resource for further research of civic engagement and 
collaborative governance in post-conflict societies.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Civic Engagement 
 
What Is Civic Engagement? 
 
Civic engagement has been defined with various meanings and has been applied 
in many different fields. Because of these multiple definitions and applications, and the 
spread of civic engagement around the world, there is no single definition for the 
practice. The United Nations suggests that all nations should use civic engagement as a 
tool to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (UN, 2007). The term has 
particular meaning in the English language, but brings some confusion when used in 
countries where English is not a common language.  Therefore, finding a broad 
definition, and then creating specific sub-meanings that refer to particular circumstances 
and applications, is a fundamental step in continuing the discussion. 
Levin (2011) describes civic engagement as, “the connection of the individual to a 
public sphere” (p.2). The connection he refers to can include connection between people, 
between people and civic associations, political life, public policy processes, and/or 
government. In this definition, civic engagement refers to “connection.” Another widely 
regarded definition is from Robert Putnam (as cited in Levine, 2011), who states that 
civic engagement is, “to refer to people’s connections with the life of their communities” 
(p.4). Both definitions highlight the relationship between and among people and 
communities. 
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Vertical Civic Engagement 
 
Currently, most scholars and organizations use the term civic engagement to refer 
to people’s participation in political or public policy development (Armony, 2004). Some 
scholars prefer using other terms for this participation, such as citizen participation 
(Bingham, Nabatchi & O’Leary, 2005), citizen engagement (Carpini, Cook & Jacobs, 
2004), and public participation (Fung, 2006). Macedo et al. (as cited in Cooper, Bryer & 
Meek, 2006) define civic engagement as, "any activity, individual or collective, devoted 
to influencing the collective life of the polity" (p.77). Cooper (as cited in Cooper, Bryer 
& Meek, 2006) describes civic engagement as, "people participating together for 
deliberation and collective action within an array of interests, institutions and networks, 
developing civic identity, and involving people in governance processes” (p.77).  
The term vertical civic engagement is used here to refer to engagement that 
focuses between people and government. Zukin at al. (2006) call any kind of engagement 
between people and government a political engagement. They define a civic engagement 
“as organized voluntary activity focuses on problem solving and helping others” (p.7). 
They clearly separate political engagement from civic engagement. Their definition of 
political engagement is in accordance with Verba, Schlozman, and Brady’s definition of 
political engagement, which distinguishes it as an, “activity that has the intent of effect of 
influencing government action – either directly by effecting the making or 
implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who 
make those policies” (as cited in Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins, & Carpini, 2006, p.6). 
One of the reasons public administrations or public agencies engage people is to 
fulfill their democratic responsibility to find better services for those every people. 
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Bingham, Nabatchi, and O’Leary (2005) say that public administrations have a 
responsibility in democracies to set their agenda in response to listening to the public’s 
voice, thereby continuously involving stakeholder and individual citizen participation in 
governance (p. 550).  
Moreover, the inherent complexity of public problems is the reason why public 
administrations cannot solve such problems without help in understanding the context 
and nuance of those complexities. Public administrations need participation from 
stakeholders in order to be successful, such as involving affected parties (Oregon Dispute 
Resolution Commission, 2006). Bingham, Nabatchi and O’Leary (2005) point out that, 
“citizens can and must play an important role in public policy and decision-making. 
Citizens have the right to decide what is important to them and how they can best achieve 
their objectives” (p.555).  
Because public problems are necessarily complex, and often difficult to solve, 
they require extensive capacity beyond that of government agencies. New and expanded 
agency functions would be an unsustainable burden to any budget, and would miss the 
pivotal role that citizen involvement plays in forging lasting solutions, and encouraging 
support for public policies. Therefore, involving people in public policy process is a 
pragmatic way toward sustainable solution building. Fung (2006) supports the value that 
citizen involvement contributes to government in the following quote.  
I suppose that the principal reason for enhancing citizen participation in any area 
of contemporary governance is that the authorized set of decision makers—
typically elected representatives or administrative officials—is somehow 
deficient. They may lack the knowledge, competence, public purpose, resources, 
or respect necessary to command compliance and cooperation. (p.67) 
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Cooper, Bryer, and Meek (2006) propose five approaches of civic engagement 
according to the civic engagement history in the US: adversarial, an individual or 
collective action to achieve a community need through social movement advocacy; the 
electoral approach, participation related to elections, voting, and political campaigns; 
legislative and administrative information exchange approaches, involving and 
participating in parliamentary hearings, for example; civil society approaches, joining or 
volunteering in social organizations; and deliberative approaches, joining with multiple 
stakeholders to find consensus solutions. Through these various approaches, civic 
engagement can be achieved, which can maximize citizen competence and trust, 
government trust, and government responsiveness and legitimacy (p.84). 
Fung (2006) proposes six ways people can participate in public policy 
development, from minimum participation to the maximum participation, requiring 
different levels of expertise. Attending public hearings and community-meetings are the 
lowest and simplest kinds of participation. People are passive in these processes, in that 
they just get information from public agencies, without any input or feedback. Expressing 
preference is the second kind of participation. In this participation, people give opinions, 
preferences, and perspectives on the public policies proposed by government agencies. 
Another type is called developing preferences, in which people engage in discussion to 
find the best solution to particular public problems. The fourth type of participation is 
called aggregation and bargaining. Through this kind of participation, people know more 
about what they want, therefore they can advocate for the best alternative solution. 
Another kind of participation is called deliberation and negotiation, in which people 
actively promote the solution they believe in. And the last kind of participation is 
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technical expertise. This kind of participation does not involve an open invitation to all 
people, but invites participation from people who have special expertise that fits with the 
public problem.  
According to the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2), Shinn 
and Singer (2012) state that there are specific levels of public participation. Informing is 
the lowest kind of public participation, where people just get information about public 
policy while agencies set agendas and make decisions. At this level, there is no direct 
interaction or give-and-take between people and agencies. Examples of this kind of 
participation are fact-sheets, websites, and open houses. The second step in participation 
is consulting. In consultation, people are more active and have a direct relationship with 
agencies. People give feedback, input, analysis, and other alternatives for solving public 
problems, and agencies give space for listening and acknowledging feedback from 
people. Examples of this kind of participation include public comment, focus groups, 
surveys, and public meetings. The third kind of public participation is engagement. 
People work directly with agencies in order to make sure that their concerns and 
aspirations are considered by agencies. Workshops and polling are examples of 
engagement. Collaboration is the fourth kind of public participation. Through 
collaboration, people who are stakeholders in the public problems are involved actively 
in all steps of the public policy decision process, all the way through to implementation. 
Some examples of this process include citizen advisory committees, consensus building, 
and participatory decision-making.  
While the National Policy Consensus Center (NPCC) put collaboration as the 
highest kind of public participation, the International Association for Public Participation 
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(IAP2) adds one more kind of participation, which is empowerment. In this type of 
participation, people decide by themselves how to solve public problems, and agencies 
implement the solutions that people decide. Citizen juries, ballots, and delegate decisions 
are examples of this kind of participation.   
Rowe and Frewer (2005) propose three kinds of public participation that refer to 
the flow of information between sponsor or government agencies and the public. Firstly, 
public communication is one kind of participation, in which information comes from 
government agencies and goes to the public. There are no responses, input or feedback 
opportunities for the public. In other words, there is only a one directional flow of 
information, from government agencies to the public. Secondly, in public consultation, 
the flow of information goes from the public to government agencies. It is the opposite of 
public communication. The last type is public participation, which includes the flow of 
information from both government agencies and public. There are more than 100 kinds of 
engagement mechanisms between public and government or government agencies, such 
as public meetings, citizen juries, and action planning.  
Civic engagement between the public and agencies specifically refers to a 
connection between and participation of members of the public with the government. 
Engagement among members of the public is not counted in this term, yet many scholars 
believe that engagement to public policy processes leads indirectly to greater engagement 
among community members (Jones, 1995).  
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Horizontal Civic Engagement 
 
Civic engagement is typically defined by a narrow description of political 
participation, or involvement in public policy making. In this definition, civic life 
includes just political and public policy activities, and although one could argue that that 
is just one part of civic life, joining people in associations that are not related to political 
and public policy making is typically not classified as civic engagement. Levine (2011) 
confirms that when civic engagement is attributed exclusively to participation in political 
and public policy processes, joining people in nonpolitical association cannot be included 
in the meaning of civic engagement, but that the definition of civic engagement has to 
extend beyond of the political and public policy (p.4). In this paper I use the term 
horizontal civic engagement as distinct from, and opposite to vertical civic engagement. 
Horizontal civic engagement refers to the engagement between people, who are at similar 
levels of engagement.  
For some scholars, civic engagement among members of the public is classified 
by the term civic life, or as civil society. Varshney (2002) defines civil society as being 
the same as “civic life” and describes it as, “the part of our life that exists between the 
state on one hand and families on the other, that allows people to come together for a 
whole variety of public activities, and that is relatively independent of the state”(p.4). 
Levine (2011) proposes that, “The members of civil society are separate one from 
another, a separation expressed by the idea of individual rights” (p.12).  
One part of civil society is the associations that are created within a society 
(Varshney, 2002). There are many kinds of associations in communities such as those 
that connect laborers, students, businesses, traders, or even neighborhood associations. 
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Associations can be classified as either voluntary or non-voluntary. People are joined in 
associations with many purposes such as political, economical and social goals. Another 
purpose is to engage with others. In this meaning, associations or civil society are viewed 
as a medium to facilitate engagement among people.  
Civil society does not only refer to associations, but also to the relationships 
among people outside of the associations. Varshney (2002) mentions other kinds of civil 
society, such as quotidian or everyday forms of civic engagement, which are defined by 
simple and routine interactions.  He gives examples of everyday forms of civic 
engagement such as, “visiting each other, eating together often enough, jointly 
participating in festival, and allowing their children to play together in the neighborhood” 
(p. 3).  
Civic society, in some ways, also refers to the concept of social capital introduced 
by Putnam (1995). He points out that civic engagement is a kind of social capital that has 
a direct relationship to the level of democracy. In other words, when there is enough civic 
engagement in society, it will bring a more democratic government. The ideas of Putnam 
are echoed by McCoy and Scully (2002) who state that, “A strong civic life and a 
flourishing democracy presume the active involvement of many people across society” 
(p. 117). Putnam generates three components of social capital: social networks, norms of 
reciprocity, and trust (as cited in Lichterman, 2006, p. 529).  
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Diagonal Civic Engagement in Post-conflict Areas 
 
A surge of civic engagement or an active civil society does not automatically 
mean that society becomes democratic, or that a democratic country is built. Armony 
(2004) shows that there are dark parts of civil society. Through his research of civil 
society in Germany, the US, and Argentina, he comes to the conclusion that there is no 
direct correlation between civil society and democracy. Many civil societies promote 
segregation and other undemocratic values. He argues that, “the sociochistorical context 
influences the nature, dispositions and orientations and impact of civic engagement” (p. 
3). 
Moreover, in order to sustain peace in post-conflict areas, people need not only 
engage civically, but they must engage a form of “peaceful civic engagement,” where the 
engagement supports specific measures of peacebuilding and works to sustain peace in 
the area. The civic engagement in post-conflict areas tends to aggravate the situation 
when the engagement is only among members of a similar group or community, and does 
not involve members from different groups or communities. Therefore, Varshney (2002) 
gives a particular description of the kind of civil society that can promote peace: inter-
group civic engagement promotes peace, whereas intra-group civic engagement does not 
build peace, and can even interfere with peace building. 
In this thesis, I will combine the vertical and horizontal meaning of civic 
engagement, as well as the diagonal meaning of civic engagement. Since my thesis 
specifically focuses on post-conflict areas, the model of civic engagement I will describe 
seeks to encourage inter-group engagement. Levine (2011) suggests that, “The broad 
hypothesis that leads some to extend the notion of civic engagement beyond the political 
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sphere is that involvement in-group life, whether political of not, tends to promote social 
cohesion” (p. 3). Civic cohesion within a group is not necessarily conducive to peace 
building and can aggravate division and contribute to conflict. The development of civic 
cohesion between groups will promote a more solid foundation for peace building.  
 
Characteristics of Diagonal Civic Engagement 
Public Problem Based  
 Public problems require people to work together, and are often considered neutral 
problems, because they do not specifically belong to only one group, but impact members 
of many groups within a community. The people most directly impacted are often the 
people who have the greatest interest in working toward solution building. But because 
public problems belong to everybody, there is a need to collaboratively define the 
problem, find answers, and implement solutions. The implication of such collaboration is 
that people from different backgrounds, affiliations, ethnicities, political ideologies, and 
religions have the opportunity to work together.  
 Public problems have to be approached with superordinate or common goals 
(Sherif, 1966). When public problems are understood as common problems, common 
goals can be found that require collaboration from diverse stakeholders to find durable 
solutions. However, one common goal is often not enough to bring solid engagement 
among people from different groups. Because there are a lot of public problems in 
communities, there are many chances to work together. Sherif, (as cited in Chirot & 
Seligman, 2001) pointed out that, “…a single superordinate goal was not sufficient to 
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reduce intergroup conflict; a series of cumulative superordinate goals was required” (p. 
321).  
 There is a relationship between political engagement and civic engagement when 
the goal of civic engagement relates to public problems. Burn, Schlozman and Verba (as 
cited in Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins & Carpini, 2006, p. 194) say that, “Voluntary 
activity in both the religious and secular domains outside of politics intersects with 
politics in many ways.” The intersection between two engagements happens when the 
goals of civic organizations are parallel to political goals, or their objectives actively 
involve public sectors, or their goals explicitly require political means.  
Engagement Between Different Groups 
Engagement among members within a group is a natural process. People classify 
themselves and are classified by others, as being members of particular social and 
identity groups. When someone is a member of a group, s/he tries to compare her/himself 
to other groups using social comparison, which is inherently biased. Tajfel and Tuner say, 
“by and large people prefer to have a positive self-concept rather negative one” (as cited 
in Brown, 2000, p. 311). There is also the process of in-group favoritism, which leads to 
thinking that one’s own group is better than another group. Mullen said, “These 
comparisons result in the in-group being viewed more favorably than the out-group” (as 
cited in Brown, 2000, p. 312).   
 Moreover, the relationships between groups can lead to a process of devaluing the 
other group. On one hand, this evaluation process creates strength among intra-group 
members. Staub (1996) argues that, “Such devaluation has many functions. It helps to 
elevate the self and to create cohesion within the group” (p.132). On the other hand, this 
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process can lead to intergroup conflict, because one or both groups can look down on the 
other group, and even enmify them.  
The relationship between groups tends to be more positive when there are a lot of 
contacts among members of the groups. Brown (2000) points out that there are pre-
conditions that are necessary to foster positive relations between groups. Brown names 
intergroup contact as an effective means to reduce prejudice, crosscutting group 
membership, and creating contact between people (people to people) rather contact 
between groups (group to group).  
 Engagement does not mean intragroup engagement, but intergroup engagement. 
Varshney (2002) argues that if there are intergroup civic engagements, either in 
associational form or everyday form, it is conducive to peace (p.3). He also mentions 
that, “both forms of engagement, if robust, promote peace; contrariwise, their absence or 
weakness opens up space for communal violence” (p. 3). Cook (as cited in Brewer & 
Miller, 1996) summarizes that, “the conditions that expected to influence the 
effectiveness of personal contact as a method of reducing intergroup hostility…” (p. 109). 
He then articulates the conditions necessary to produce favorable attitudes:  
1. The situation promotes equal status interactions between members of the 
social groups,  
2. The interaction encourages behaviors that disconfirm stereotype that the 
groups hold of each other,  
3. Cooperative interdependence among members of both groups is involved, 
4. The situation must have high “acquaintance potential,” promoting intimate 
contact between participants and,  
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5. The social norms in the situation must be perceived as favoring intergroup 
acceptance.” (p.109). 
Formal Process 
Formal means that a civic engagement process is planed carefully through several 
meetings. The process is not satisfied by an incidental meeting, or even by a single event 
meeting. The formality of the process requires that it be facilitated by a trusted person or 
organization, and well documented so that people can access information about the 
responsibility and accountability of the public problem-solving process.  
However, using a formal process doesn’t mean that only government agencies can 
facilitate civic engagement. Non-government institutions also can facilitate civic 
engagement as long as they are talking about the public problem in a formal way. This 
character is neither the everyday form of civic engagement nor the association form of 
civic engagement (Varshney, 2002). However, the process might lead to or include the 
association form of civic engagement.  
 
Collaborative Governance 
 
What Is Collaborative Governance? 
 
Changing concepts of governance have shifted the way that government is 
practiced throughout the world. The word government is best understood as authority, 
power, and legacy in implementing activities, while governance relates to the process of 
creating and implementing activities by sharing goals with civic, public, and private 
entities that do not always have power and authority (Bingham, Nabatchi & O’leary, 
	   23 
2005). The concept of governance also relates to that of democracy. Through the election 
process, people choose representation that is meant to reflect peoples’ desire for how 
public issues should be handled. When representatives are elected, they make laws to 
respond to public concerns. Then public agencies apply those laws to handle public 
problems (Ansell, 2011, p.3).  
As communities become bigger, with huge populations from different 
backgrounds and varied interests, public problems change fast and become more 
complex. Sometimes, government agencies cannot handle the complexity of public 
problems by themselves. They have to respond to the complexity by engaging, involving 
and working with other sectors –– private and civic –– to solve the problems. 
Collaborative governance is a way to do just that, and has gradually become a pivotal and 
appropriate way to solve the complexity of public problems.  
There is no single definition for collaborative governance because the wide and 
spreading field in which it is applied has embraced a diverse range of definitions that 
pertain to the different disciplines where it is found. Moreover, there are a lot of diverse 
practices that are included within the term collaborative governance.  
The use of collaborative governance approaches in public policy development has 
received increasing attention from scholars over the past decade. However, according to 
Agranoff and McGuire, collaborative governance originated in the 1960s as part of 
intergovernmental cooperation. Collaborative governance has since become an essential 
part of public administration, democracy, and management (Emerson, Nabatchi & 
Balogh, 2011, p 3-4). In environmental management, the principles of collaborative 
governance have been used for several decades. Some cases related to water rights, forest 
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management, and national parks administration, have used collaborative governance to 
forge sustainable solutions. There are a lot of scholars in resource management who 
suggest this approach. Elinor Ostrom, uses a parallel term, collective action (Ostrom, 
1990), and others use the term collaborative governance (Ansell, 2011; O’Brien, 2012), 
while others from public administration backgrounds prefer the term collaborative public 
management. Agranoff, McGuire, O’leary, Gerard, and Bingham point out that,  
Collaborative public management is: a concept that describes the process of 
facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problem 
that cannot be solved or easily solved by single organizations. Collaborative 
means to co-labor, to achieve common goals, often working across boundaries 
and multi stakeholder and multi-actor relationships. Collaboration is based on the 
value or reciprocity. Collaborative management may include participatory 
governance: the active involvement of citizens in government decision-making. 
(as cited in O’Leary, & Bingham, 2009, p. 3) 
 
The process of collaborative public governance is conducted by governments, 
government agencies, or government organizations as a means to solve public policy 
problems. It does not involve non-government agencies, or private/civil society in 
conducting the process. 
In this thesis, the term collaborative governance will be used rather than 
collaborative public management. One of the reasons for using the term collaborative 
governance is that this terminology has a global scope. After comparing articles about 
collaborative governance and collaborative public management, Kapucu, Yuldashev and 
Bakiev (2009) found that collaborative public management is a term used to describe 
local approaches, which focus on collaborative practice for social problems, and which 
reach the organizational level of community goals. Collaborative governance, in contrast, 
has more of a global scope, and focuses on the substance and process of collaboration to 
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solve social problems, improve nonhierarchical and decentralized institutional structures, 
and develop citizen participation mechanisms.  
As stated earlier, there are a lot of divergent definitions of collaborative 
governance. In the most general sense, collaborative governance can be defined by its 
primary actors, who typically are government agencies. Some scholars attempt to narrow 
the definition, such as Ansell and Gash (as cited in O’Brien, 2012), who define 
collaborative governance as,  
A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-
state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, 
consensus oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public 
policy or manage public programs or assets. (p.1) 
 
This definition is supported by O’Brein (2012), who describes collaborative governance 
as,  
a forum (that) is formally organized and meets regularly, is initiated by a public 
agency, includes non-state private and public participants who are directly 
involved in decision-making (rather than just consulted), works to achieve 
decisions by consensus and focuses collaboration on the development of public 
policy or management. (p.1) 
 
Another definition, from Shinn and Singer (2012), clearly mentions that a 
collaborative governance process is conducted by one or more public agencies. They 
point out that collaborative governance is, “One or more public agencies developing a 
policy or implementing a solution to a resolve a problem using a consensus-driven 
process with diverse parties who will be effected by the solution or who can help to 
implement it” (p.8). Similarly, a definition coming from the pragmatic democracy 
perspective offers collaborative governance as a solution for public agencies to overcome 
the complexity of the public problems. Ansell (2000) suggests that,  
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Armed with the idea that agencies must be problem-solving communities and that 
their role is, in part, to expand societal consent for creative problem solving and 
widen the sphere of responsibility for problems, we are brought to the idea of 
collaborative governance. In models of collaborative governance, public agencies 
directly engage stakeholders in agency decision-making in order to better solve 
public problems and to create broad-based consent for agency policy. (p.18) 
 
From the most basic definition of collaborative governance, Amsler and Kopell 
(2005) forge an etymological definition that follows.  
Collaborative governance combines two basic concepts: 
•  Collaborative: To co-labor, to cooperate to achieve common goals working 
across boundaries in multi-sector relationships. Cooperation is based on the 
value of reciprocity. 
•  Governance: To steer the process that influences decisions and actions 
within the private, public, and civic sectors. 
Although government plays a role in governance, it is not the only player. 
Collaborative governance is about the process of engaging citizens in making 
decisions in more inclusive ways. (p. 3) 
 
From the many definitions offered above, a fair conclusion is that, while 
government and government agencies are most commonly primary actors, non-
governmental agencies can also be actors in collaborative governance processes –– as 
long as the process involves multiple stakeholder groups in problem solving, and includes 
private, public or civic sectors. Carlson (2007) mentions that, “Collaborative governance 
includes a variety of processes in which all sectors – public, private, and civic – are 
convened to work together to achieve solutions to public problems that go beyond what 
any sector could achieve on its own” (p.11).  
One essential element in a collaborative process is that it starts with a public 
problem. Public problems are problems that relate to or will affect many sectors or 
stakeholders, and make it is necessary for stakeholder groups to work together. Other 
sectors than government agencies, such as private and civil, have the chance to initiate 
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collaborative process, as long as the problems are public problems. In other words, public 
problems are not always under the purview of government public policy.  
 
Circumstances Requiring Collaborative Governance 
 
Collaborative governance processes can be applied when there are specific 
circumstances that involve the interests of multiple stakeholder groups. One of the 
primary reasons for people or organizations to get involved in partnerships is resource 
dependency. With very few exceptions, most people in modern society cannot meet all of 
their own needs for resources. Despite this fact, Rogers and Whetten (1982) point out that 
people and organizations typically do not want to rely or be dependent on others, but that 
they always need others to fulfill their resource needs. Gray, Thomson, and Perry 
recognize that, “ when individuals and organizations are unable to accomplish something 
on their own, is a broadly recognized precondition for collaborative action” (as cited in 
Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011, p.9). 
Because of the inevitable nature of interdependency, there is a corresponding need 
for contact between people and organizations. Van de Ven, Emmett, and Koening (1975) 
argue that, “The basic assumption is that individual organizations do not have all the 
resources they need to achieve their goals and rely on inputs from the environment, 
which itself consists of a “collection of interacting, groups, and persons” (as cited in 
O’Leary & Bingham, 2009, p. 32). Interdependency of resources between people, groups, 
and organizations leads to resources being exchanged among them. Tschirhart, Amezcua, 
and Anker point out that the dependency levels among agents in a resource exchange 
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system is dependent upon the scarcity and availability of resources (as cited in O’Leary & 
Bingham, 2009, p. 17). 
Resource scarcity can be a reason for collaboration among people and 
organizations. Scarcity leads them to work together to find innovative solutions to 
manage scarcity that give mutual benefit to all stakeholders. Thomson and Perry (2006) 
find that, “Devolution, rapid technology change, scarce resources, and rising 
organizational interdependencies are driving increasing levels of collaboration” (p. 20).  
Another reason for working together is political interest. In some countries, 
particularly those with multiparty democratic systems, coalitions among political parties 
for creating government are needed when there is not single-party majority wins in 
elections. O’Leary and Bingham (2009) point out that,  
Through participation in a policy network, organizations can (1) promote the 
views or desires of their members or constituency, (2) gain access to political 
officials or decision processes and/or cultivate political alliances, (3) gain political 
legitimacy or authority, and (4) promote organizational policies or programs. (p. 
34)     
 
Lack of authority and overlapping authority also can cause all sectors, public, 
private, and civic, to work collaboratively. Shinn and Singer (2012) describe the 
conditions required for collaborative governance as being, “When policy issues have high 
degrees of uncertainty, ambiguity or indeterminacy; when authority is overlapping; when 
solutions require joint action; when you require their information, or their concurrence, or 
their resources” (p. 18). 
A common purpose, or common goals, can also be reasons for people or 
organizations to work with others. When there are compatible goals between people or 
organizations, it tends to be a motivation for them to support each other to work together. 
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Gary (1989) and Roger and Whetten (1982) point out that, “ Organizations form network 
linkages to achieve similar, compatible, or congruous goals” (as cited in O’Leary & 
Bingham, 2009, p. 33).  
A study of intergroup relations conducted by Muzafer Sherif showed that when 
there are superordinate goals, which can be achieved if members from different groups 
work together in mutual cooperation, the groups who have otherwise conflicted before 
tend to work together effectively (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961).  
In conclusion, while public problems are at the core of collaborative governance, 
there are some characteristic relations between stakeholders of public problems. The 
stakeholders will most likely endorse collaboration when facing resource dependency, 
resource scarcity, political interest, lack of authority, and a common purpose between 
stakeholders. 
 
Peace Collaborative Governance 
 
Collaborative governance processes that involve multiple stakeholders from 
different backgrounds have been found to be an effective way to facilitate civic 
engagement in public policy decision-making processes in the US. Carlson (2007) states, 
“Over the past 30 years, collaboration has proven effective in resolving difficult adaptive 
problems” (p.11).   
Many factors, explored above, lead stakeholder groups to work together 
collaboratively. Yet, those factors do not fully guarantee a successful collaborative 
governance process. Legal, government, cultural, social, and historical contexts frame the 
relationship between parties, and will affect how the collaborative process is engaged. 
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Therefore, there are no specific recipes for how to apply collaborative governance in 
every place and for any public problem.  
There are many kinds of collaborative governance processes in practice. 
Therefore, some guidance might fit with some collaborative processes, but needs 
adjustment in order to apply it to other processes. To distinguish among different 
approaches, Amsler, T., & Kopell, M. (2005) identified three general categories of 
collaborative governance: public deliberation forums, which involve the public in 
interactive discussions aimed at clarifying points of view and changing common 
understandings and making recommendations for public agencies’ actions. Next, 
community problem solving, which relates to place-based problem solving, where 
communities, government, and private groups collaborate to address problems together 
over extended timeframes, for instance, how to reduce violence in communities. The last 
category is multi-stakeholder conflict resolution where multiple stakeholders with 
different interests are brought together to reach specific agreements by consensus 
building or mediation (p. 9-10).  
Some organizations and scholars give general guidance. The Oregon Dispute 
Resolution Commission (2006) lists the common features of collaborative governance as 
inclusivity and voluntary participation, ownership of the process by participants, keeping 
inform to people (giving update information to people), developing a common definition 
of the problem, joint education among participants, developing varied options, 
consensus-based decision making, participant supervision of implementation, with the 
process being a supplement to the existing formal legal decision-making processes (p. 13-
14).  
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Shinna and Singer (2012) explain three phases of collaborative decision making 
on public issues. The first is to convene, which consists of assessment and organization; 
the second is to seek agreement, which is divided into education and negotiation; and the 
last phase is to implement, which focuses on implementing the agreements (p. 37-42).    
Carlson (2007) divides the stages of the collaboration process into three steps.  
Before includes an assessment to determine the feasibility of using a collaborative 
process; during involves setting up ground rules, and inviting stakeholders to come 
together at the table to share information, define the problem, and generate solutions; and 
after, where stakeholders work together to implement the agreements and monitor the 
results (p. 19). She also offers the principles of the collaborative governance process as 
transparency and accountability, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, 
responsiveness, forum neutrality, and consensus-based decision making (p. 17).   
These guidelines of the characteristics and principles of collaborative governance 
mostly refer to the applications that are underway in the United States. There are no 
specific guidelines for collaborative governance in post-conflict areas, which tend toward 
segregated political affiliation, social identity, and geographic allegiance. In order to find 
constructive and effective ways to apply collaborative governance in post-conflict areas, 
the process has to be pursued hand-in-hand with the peace-building process, as a way to 
sustain the post-conflict, or peaceful, conditions.  
One of the indicators of peace, according to Varshney (2002), is that there is inter-
group civic engagement within communities. Civic engagement, or the involvement and 
participation of people in public problems, has concerned many scholars, including 
Cooper, Bryer and Meek (2006), Bingham, Nabatchi and O’Leary (2005), and Fung 
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(2006). However, there has been no specific and deep research on the interplay between 
collaborative governance and civic engagement among participants, although some 
scholars have mentioned in passing that collaborative governance also facilitates 
improved relations among participants. According to Graddy and Chen (as cited in 
O’Leary & Bingham, 2009), the effectiveness of collaboration can be measured by 
improvements in the relationships and developments within the organizations (p. 57).  
This research study examines whether and how collaborative governance has the 
potential to facilitate civic engagement among participants in post-conflict areas. Even 
though there are many guidelines, characteristics, and principles about collaborative 
governance, this study focuses on several characteristics of the collaborative governance 
process that promote civic engagement. These characteristics are: inclusiveness, a neutral 
forum, face-to-face meeting, and structured process.  
Inclusiveness  
Inclusiveness is one of the key characteristics of collaborative governance. Every 
government agency, person, and organization that has interest in or a high probability of 
being affected by a decision and the implementation of that decision are welcome to join 
a collaborative governance process. Interest in and impact from the decision creates an 
open invitation for stakeholders to join the process. In Introduction of Creating a Culture 
of Collaboration, Schuman points out that, “All individuals and interest groups in all 
sectors of society have the right to meaningful participation in the decisions that affect 
them” (as cited in O’ Brien, 2012, p.6).  
Determining who is interested in and who will be affected by a given process 
provides a means to select and eliminate participants in the collaborative process. Even 
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though collaborative processes are inclusive, people and organizations are invited to join 
at their will. Therefore collaborative governance cannot be imposed, or operate in a 
coercive way. In Collaborative Approaches: A Handbook for Public Policy Decision-
Making and Conflict Resolution, produced by the Oregon Dispute Resolution 
Commission in 2006, it is clearly stated that, “Participation is inclusive and voluntary. All 
major interests that will be affected by the outcome and those in a position to hinder or 
facilitate the implementation of the decisions are identified and representatives of those 
interests participate in the process” (p. 13).  
O’Brien (2012) indicates that when collaborative governance processes miss key 
stakeholders, it can lead to questions about the legitimacy of the process. Chrislip & 
Larson (1994), Innes (1996), Crosby & Bryson (2005) and Gray (1989) mention that, 
“the legitimacy of the collaborative process depends on being inclusive of a broad 
spectrum of stakeholders all of whom are interested in the problem under consideration” 
(as cited in O’Brien, 2012, p.6). The inclusive character of collaborative governance also 
increases its legitimacy by averting counterproductive oppositional responses from 
people during the process and during the implementation of results.  
The number of participants can increase when collaborative governance enters the 
implementation phase. There is no particular limit of how many participants can be 
involved, although limitations can be defined through agreements among stakeholders 
who can name which participants do need to be involved in the process. The inclusive 
character of the process always creates space for stakeholder involvement.  
 Public problems present opportunities for participants to go beyond political, 
religious, or ethnic segregation. Therefore, collaborative governance has the potential to 
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convene stakeholders from different backgrounds, different societies, and even people 
from divided societies. The inclusive nature of the process can create opportunities for 
stakeholder cooperation, even when they are living in divided societies. Therefore, 
collaborative governance has the secondary benefit of bringing people from different 
backgrounds together to create relationships among them. The Oregon Dispute 
Resolution Commission (2006) recognizes that through, “managing diversity and 
building common ground, collaborative process can help increasingly diverse 
communities improve inter-group relations, building trust, and finding common ground” 
(p.16). 
Participants from different backgrounds stimulate horizontal relationships among 
parties, and increases the likelihood that government agencies will serve as mediators or 
facilitators of collaborative process, rather than giving instruction through vertical 
relationships. O‘Leary, Gerard, and Bingham (2006) describe the role of government 
agencies in collaborative governance by explaining that, “Public managers now find 
themselves not as unitary leaders of unitary organizations. Instead, they find themselves 
convening, facilitating, negotiating, mediating, and collaborating across boundaries” 
(p.8).   
Neutral Forum 
The inclusive character of collaborative governance is consistent with the central 
concept of a neutral forum in collaborative processes. A neutral forum means that all 
stakeholders feel safe, free from any kind of coercion, and believe that the forum does not 
favor one or some of the parties, but rather brings all parties to the process with equal 
position. A neutral forum, though subjectively interpreted by every single stakeholder. 
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could be created by a third party who does not have a vested interest in the problem or 
possible results. It also could be created by one of the stakeholders of the problem, if 
there is agreement among all stakeholders.  
A neutral forum can be created through a committee that has representation of all 
parties. Government or government agencies have a high possibility of being neutral 
parties, although it is not always possible. Carlson (2007) says that,  
the neutral forum to mean an institution that has a reputation for impartiality, 
objectivity, and credibility and the ability to create a neutral “space” in which 
leaders can gather participants to address issues. It is not necessarily a particular 
place or location, but rather is an entity with the credibility to ensure participants 
that the collaborative process will operate in an unbiased environment suitable for 
discussion and deliberation. (p. 39)   
 
In order to build trust among stakeholders, they need basic trust that allows them 
to come to the table and meet with the other stakeholders. There is no measurement of the 
degree of trust that is required for parties to come to the process. However, the proof that 
parties have enough trust to get involved in the process is when they come and join in the 
process. Therefore, part of the job of the facilitator in the collaborative process is to make 
an effort to increase trust among stakeholders, and also between stakeholders and the 
facilitator.  
The trust among parties, and also between parties and the organization or person 
who is conducting the collaborative process, has to be maintained. Ansell and Gash point 
out that many studies show trust as being centrally important in collaboration (as cited in 
O’Brien, 2012). O’Brien (2012) echoes that, “At the very core, collaborative governance 
is a process in which sufficient trust in other stakeholders and commitment to the process 
has to generate ongoing pursuit of win-win policies.” Trust building can be started from 
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agreements on small, everyday things, which do not require high risks for the 
participants. For instance, an agreement about the ground rules of the process lays the 
foundation for further trust-building before entering into the core issues of the subject at 
hand. Through building positive mutual experiences among parties, as well as with the 
conductor of the process, trust can be built, little by little. Bryson calls these incremental 
gains, “small wins” (as cited in Osborne, 2010, p. 168).  
Face-to-Face Meetings  
The collaborative governance process requires physical gathering and meeting 
among parties. The facilitator of the process conducts and facilitates a direct meeting 
among participants. The physical meeting is also an indicator of participants’ 
commitment in the process, as it might be a risk to meet with other participants –– 
especially if there is conflicting interests among participant groups, and particularly in 
areas that are post-conflict. When participants come to a physical meeting, it is sign that 
there is an enough trust among parties to start the process.  
One of the differences that collaborative governance has, compared with other 
kinds of public participation, is that the portion of physical meetings is higher. Some 
public policy decisions are developed through public deliberation by polling, discussions 
in the media, using radio, TV, or newspaper. In order to gain a wide range of 
stakeholders, face-to-face meetings can be combined with other tools for engaging 
members of the public. Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2011) point out that, “Principled 
engagement occurs over time and may include different stakeholders at different points 
and take place in face-to-face or virtual formats, cross-organizational networks, or private 
and public meetings, among other settings” (p.10).  
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Direct meetings are more deliberate, because participants directly hear concerns 
and interests from others, and perhaps as importantly, they can confirm and reconfirm 
information. Bingham (2006) concludes that,  “more deliberative forms of public 
participation for making policy, and dispute resolution processes for implementing and 
enforcing it, all empower citizens and stakeholders to exercise their voice and become 
more engaged in their communities” (p.823). The facilitator of the collaborative process 
becomes key to the success of face-to-face meetings.  
Through face-to-face meetings, the collaborative governance process can be a 
dialogue process that helps stakeholders find common ground and build an understanding 
between parties. When there is dialogue, everybody has a greater chance of winning. 
Bohm (1996) states that dialogue might produce a new meaning or understanding that 
will be a rope to tie all members together, or glue for society to stay together. The 
opposite of dialogue is discussion, which is a process of bringing ideas up for analysis. In 
a discussion process participants present their perspectives, opinions, and ideas and then 
their analyses.  At the end of this process, one participant’s ideas will triumph over those 
of the others, and all other participants will have lost. In a dialogue, by contrast, all 
participants become winners, through a framework of mutual gain; there are no win-lose 
situations. 
Structured Process 
Another characteristic element of collaborative governance is that it requires a 
structured process. Collaborative governance is an ongoing process that requires more 
than a one-time meeting among participants due to the complexity of public problems 
and the common presence of diversity in stakeholder participation. Differences in 
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background, interests, power, and the authority of participants means the process needs to 
be well-organized, in order to provide a chance for all participants to articulate their 
concerns and interests regarding the public problems.  
We have seen above that there are a number of ways to see the structure of a 
collaborative process. As one example, The National Policy Consensus Center at 
Portland State University divides collaboration processes in three phases: convene, 
assessment/planning and organization; seek agreement, education and 
negotiation/resolution; implement, implementation and monitoring, review, evaluation, 
and course correction as necessary (Shinn & Singer, 2012, p.37). 
The person, organization, or government agency that organizes the process, plans 
how it will proceed, develops meeting agendas, sets the place and time, invites 
participants, and arranges facilitators. When the meetings are well-organized, participants 
are able to predict how the meeting process will unfold, what issues will be addressed, 
and how to have realistic expectations of the outcomes. When the process is structured, 
participants are able to meet regularly, which stimulates communication among 
participants and improves their relations. Jones recognizes that collaborative processes do 
wonders for improving relationships.   
Many of the parties in a collaborative process will have working relationships that 
extend long beyond the conclusion of the process. The understanding and 
camaraderie they forget through the collaborative process can result in strong 
foundation for cooperation in the future. (as cited in Oregon Dispute Resolution 
Commission, 2006, p.16) 
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Through a structured process, with regular meetings, the collaborative governance 
process gives space for people to communicate with each other, rather than just following 
instructions from a government agency. Horizontal communication among parties in the 
collaborative process creates a shift in the vertical communication that is more common 
between people and government. Parker & O’Leary note of the, “…the collaborative 
governance approach – (is) a shift from a ‘top-down’ culture of command and control to 
a learning culture that enables a truly participative and deliberative engagement with the 
wider community” (as cited in O’Brien, 2012, p. 4).  
Through reviewing the literature on civic engagement and collaborative 
governance, it can be concluded that there is no literature that focuses on post-conflict 
areas. Therefore, this literature review concludes with a model of civic engagement and 
collaborative governance that emphasizes horizontal civic engagement with three 
characteristics: focusing on public problems; inclusive engagement of different groups in 
a neutral forum; and the use of formal, structured processes that include face-to-face 
meetings.  
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CHAPTER III 
CASE STUDY BACKGROUND 
 
Ambon Conflict 
 
Background 
 
 
Ambon is the name of an island in the Maluku Province, in the eastern part of the 
archipelago of islands that create the country of Indonesia (Map 1). It is also the name of 
the indigenous people who live in Ambon, Haruku, Saparua, Nusa laut and the southern 
part of Seram Island. Ambon is an important island in the Maluku province due to it 
being the home of the capital of the province, Ambon City. People mostly refer to the 
Maluku Province as simply “Maluku.” In 1999, through law # 46, the central government 
divided the Maluku province into two provinces: North Maluku Province, with Ternate as 
the capital city; and Maluku Province, with Ambon City as its capital city.  
Map 1: Indonesia 
 
               (source: http-//earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/indonesia/map) 
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That separation made the Maluku Province have a total area of 81.376 km2, with 527.191 
km2 of sea and 54.185 of land. There are 559 islands in the Province, with Ambon Island 
having the highest population and Ambon City being the most densely populated among 
other cities in that Province (www.malukuprov.go.id). Ambon City is about 2.403 km 
from Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia.  
Maluku became famous in the 16th century when Portugal, Holland, and England 
came to that area to find spices, including clove and nutmeg. Those two spices are 
originally from the Maluku islands, which is why the islands are often called the “Spice 
Islands.” At the time of colonial discovery, those commodities were very important in 
international trading due to their value. They were expensive, profitable, and therefore 
desirable commodities. When Maluku became the center for the spice trade, Portugal 
built a fort on Ambon Island and started to monopolize spice trading. When the Dutch 
defeated Portugal, the Dutch colonialized Maluku and controlled the spice trade. The 
Dutch also used Ambon Island as the center for spices trading. They built the Amsterdam 
Fort in Ambon bay, which later became Ambon City. At the same time, England 
controlled spice commodities in some islands in Maluku, such as Rhun Island, and 
through the Breda agreement of 1667, the Dutch and England bartered with England 
getting Manhattan Island in The United States and the Dutch getting Rhun Island.  
The Portuguese and Dutch did not only come to Maluku to find spices but they 
also introduced Christianity to the people of Maluku. At that time in Ambon Island, the 
people were either Muslim or animist. First Portugal came and introduced Catholicism. 
When they were defeated by the Dutch, the Catholics in Maluku were converted into 
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Christian Protestants. In Maluku, “Christian” means both Christian Protestant and 
Catholic; however, Catholics in Maluku are a minority (although in the Maluku Tengara 
district, Catholics outnumber other Christians and Muslims). 
Traditionally, people in Ambon stay in separate villages –– either in Christian or 
Muslim villages (International Crisis Group, 2000). Even though they live separately, 
they have a ‘Pela,’ or cultural alliance between one or more Muslim villages with one or 
more Christian villages. This alliance is based on brotherhood or a historical alliance 
between villages. Because of these alliances, they treat each other like brothers and 
sisters. Some pela prohibit marriage between villages. They also have obligations to help 
each other when one of the pela members experiences ordeals (Bartels, 1977). 
In 1999, the Malukus, and especially Ambon, became known internationally 
because of the huge conflict that happened there. Even though the violence happened in 
various places and islands in Maluku, Ambon City was the main battleground and the 
epicenter of the conflict. Some scholars prefer to use “war” to name that conflict, rather 
than just calling it a ‘conflict,’ due to the tremendous amount and impact of the violence 
(van Klinken, 2001). From 1999 to 2002, approximately 5,000 people died and a third of 
the population left their homes and became Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (Brown, 
Wilson and Hadi, 2005). There are no sure numbers to quantify the economic and social 
costs from the conflict.  
Even the exact number of people who died in this conflict is not entirely certain. 
There is no certainty about the real number of victims but the number killed in this 
conflict has important meaning for the conflicting parties. The number of victims could 
be interpreted as evidence that one or the other group was stronger or weaker, and one 
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group or the other suffered most. Therefore, the Bakubae peace movement used other 
ways to determine the number of victims, and that number was agreed upon by 
representatives of both conflicting parties. Through that process, they came up with a 
number of more then 9,700 deaths in the conflict from 1999 to 2001 (Malik & Yayasan, 
2003).  
Conflict Chronology 
 
The conflict in Ambon happened primarily from 1999 to 2002, followed by 
sporadic violence in 2003 and 2004. Because the conflict happened over multiple years, 
scholars divided the conflict into distinct phases. Human Rights Watch also divided the 
Maluku conflict into two phases: the first phase was January 19, 1999 until February 5, 
1999 and the second phase was February 13, 1999 until March 10, 1999 (Human Rights 
Watch, 1999).  
Van Klinken (2007) divided the Maluku conflict into five phases. The first phase 
was from January 19, 1999 to May 1999.  In May 1999 there was a national election 
campaign, during which time the violence decreased. The second phase was end of July 
1999 until July 2000. This phase happened after the election was over and people knew 
the result of the election. One of the big violent incidents in this phase was a massacre in 
North Maluku, where approximate 500 Muslims died (International Crisis Group, 2000). 
The third phase was in April 2000, when the Muslim militia, Laskar Jihad from Java 
Island, came to help Muslims in Ambon. The fourth phase was fitful fighting after Laskar 
Jihad, and lasted until the central government facilitated a peace agreement between 
representatives of Muslim and Christian Maluku communities in Malino, South Sulawesi 
Province. The peace agreement is famous as Malino peace agreement II or Malino II, and 
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was signed in February 2002. The last phase involved some violence after delegations of 
Malino II from Muslim and Christian communities came back to Ambon (van Klinken, 
2007, p. 89-99). 
Even though scholars divided the conflict into different phases, most agree that 
the conflict started on January 19, 1999, even though several violent incidents had 
happened before. On December 12, 1998, there was fighting in Ambon between Muslims 
from the Wailete Village and Christians from the Hatiwe Village. On January 14, 1999, 
there was a riot in Dobo, on Aru Island, between Muslims from Bugis and Makasar and 
Ambonese ethnic groups, which led to 8 deaths. Those events were believed to be the 
preliminary or conditioning events that led to the main conflict (Buchanan, 2011, p. 16). 
At approximately 3 pm on January 19, 1999, there was fighting between a 
Christian taxi driver and a Muslim youth from the Batu Merah village in Ambon City. 
Immediately following this fight, simultaneous attacks erupted between Batu Merah 
Village, the Muslim village, and Mardika Village, the Christian village. Before that day, 
youth fighting among villages in Maluku was common. It had even happened between 
those villages that erupted in violence in 1999.  However, on that day, youth fighting 
triggered and accelerated sporadic riots in most of Ambon City, which continued until the 
night. Many houses, markets, and shops surrounding the city were burned. That day was 
coincidentally a special and sacred day for Muslims, Idul Fitri, the first day after 
Muslims finished one month of fasting for the holy month of Ramadan (Van Klinken, 
2001). 
The first issues that came up in the riots were ethnic issues. The targets attacked 
were framed as mostly migrants from Bugis, Buton and as having Makasar ethnicity 
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(BBM). Yet, when the news spread out that mosques and churches had been burned, the 
conflict shifted to religious issues. From that day, in order to distinguish between 
Christians and Muslims, Christian started wearing red headcloths, while Muslims started 
wearing white cloths or headscarves. Later, they used the term “red group,” to identify 
Christians and “white group,” to identify Muslims.  
In May 1999, there was a national election campaign that caused the intensity of 
violence in Ambon to decrease. Political parties, and candidates themselves, wanted to 
get maximum votes from both communities; therefore, party representatives in Muslim 
and Christian communities worked together to get voters’ support. However, after the 
general election took place, and the results were known in July 1999, the conflict erupted 
again. Some scholars identify the conflicts that erupted after the national election as the 
start of the second phase of the conflict.  
The Struggle Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI-P) won the 1999 elections by a 
landslide in the Maluku Province. This PDI-P was identified as a ‘Christian party’ due to 
the fact that the party was created from a merger of some historic parties, one of which 
was the Indonesian Christian Party (PARTINDO) that was dominant in Maluku in 1955. 
The results of the election, and the perception of Christian dominance, accelerated a 
whole new episode of the conflict (Van Klinken, 2007).  
In October 1999, North Maluku was forced to become a new province, separate 
from the Maluku Province. The influence of the conflict still spread to the new province. 
Even though the reasons for the conflict were different, there was a similar nuance and 
sentiment to the Maluku conflict. The conflict was triggered by fighting between Muslim 
youth from Malifud, and Christian youth from Kao. However, the main reasons for the 
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conflict were related to boundaries. Muslim migrants, primarily from the Makian Island 
who stayed in Malifud Village, wanted to have their own sub-district –– separate from 
the Kao sub-district, which was predominantly Christian. To meet different needs, the 
government had planned to create a new Malifud sub-district, separate from Kao sub-
district, which had been rejected by Kao people. The biggest occurrence of violence 
happened in North Maluku, where approximately 800 Muslims died in a massacre in one 
mosque in Tobelo, in the North Halmahera district (Buchanan, 2011, p. 18-19) 
The massacre stimulated sympathy and a resulting call to reaction among 
Muslims in Java. In January 2000, there was a big demonstration of approximately 
100,000 Muslims in Jakarta City, the capital of Indonesia. The demonstration demanded 
that the central government do whatever was necessary to end the conflict in Maluku; and 
warned that if the government could not stop the conflict in Maluku, Muslims in Java 
would be forced to go to Maluku to fight the battle themselves, in solidarity with their 
fellow Muslims (Hasan, 2002). 
In May 2000, Laskar Jihad, a Muslim militia group, came to Ambon. This group 
was relatively well-organized and the members had received training before coming 
(Hasan, 2002). In June 2000, this group, along with some Muslims in Ambon, attacked a 
police station and stole approximately 800 weapons (Nusa Bhakti, Yanuarti, & Nurhasim, 
2009; Malik & Yayasan TIFA, 2003). When Laskar Jihad came to Ambon, it changed 
the constellation of conflict in Ambon. Before their arrival, the Christians dominated the 
conflict. After their arrival, Muslims acquired more power and dominance.  
The presence of Laskar Jihad created a distinct response from the Christian side. 
Approximately 100 Christians initiated the Maluku Front Sovereignty (FKM), which 
	   47 
many people believed was a resurgence of the rebellion group, Republic of South Maluku 
(RMS), established in 1950 to fight for independence from Indonesia. At that point, the 
conflict became focused on separatist issues. The issues of separatism gave legitimacy for 
the Indonesian military to come to Ambon, where they conducted special operations to 
decrease the conflict in Maluku. Despite the military involvement, the conflicts continued 
(Buchanan, 2011, p. 18; Malik & Yayasan TIFA, 2003). 
In February 2002, the central government facilitated peace talks in Malino, South 
Sulawesi. The Muslim delegation came with 35 people, while the Christian delegation 
had 34 people. The meeting was conducted over three days and ended with the signing of 
a peace agreement. This peace agreement was then famous as the Malino II peace 
agreement. When the delegations returned to Ambon, some violent actions by Muslims 
unhappy with the peace agreement, were perpetrated against members of the Muslim 
delegation. One house of a Muslim delegation member was attacked and burned, to 
challenge his legitimacy as a valid representative of Muslims in Maluku.  
The Malino II peace agreement succeeded in reducing incidents of conflict, but it 
did not automatically bring peace to Maluku. Some violent incidents were still happening 
sporadically in Ambon after the Malino II peace agreement. One of the biggest riots was 
in April of 2002, and led to the governor’s office being burned. Since geographic 
segregation among communities was greater than even before the agreement, a direct 
attack, face to face, among communities was difficult. Therefore terrorist actions of 
shooting and bombing were sometime used. In 2003, the situation in Maluku was far 
better than before, and there were no incidents of significant violence during this time, 
though people still lived in segregated areas.  
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On April 25, 2004, a big riot happened in Ambon City after members and leaders 
of FKM met to commemorate the establishment of RMS. After the ceremony was 
finished, police captured the leader of FKM and 25 other followers, and brought them to 
the police station. That incident created new tensions between Muslim and Christian 
communities, and riots started within a week. Forty people died, and many houses, 
schools, and other public facilities were burned (International Crisis Group, 2004). 
 
Why Did the Conflict Happen in Ambon? 
 
Ambon, with the strong history of the pela alliance, used to be an example of 
peace and tolerant relations between Muslim and Christian communities in Indonesia. 
Therefore, when the conflict occurred, many people thought it was affected by outside 
factors or that it was created by those from outside who would benefit from rioting in 
Ambon. They called the unknown people or forces that created conflict in Maluku the 
“provocateur” (van Klinken, 2007). This term actually did not clearly indicate who the 
real provocateur of Maluku conflict was. While many people believed there was a 
provocateur, it was difficult to prove. However, the local and national media always 
suspected that conflict in Ambon was created by provocateurs.  
The Ambon conflict was also affected by the transition to a democratic process 
within the Indonesian central government in Jakarta. The conflict happened after 
President Suharto stepped down in 1998. He had been in power for 32 years, with 
authoritarian and centralized government rule. The transition to democracy led Indonesia 
to face many significant changes. One of the significant changes was the introduction of 
Law No.22/1999, which gave more autonomy to local government. Almost all authority 
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was given or delegated to local government, except for issues relating to foreign policy, 
security and defense, justice, monetary and fiscal concerns, and religious affairs. The fast 
democratic changes in Indonesia, on one hand, brought good changes for Indonesians 
such as free speech, open media, and direct multi-party elections. On the other hand, the 
fast democratization process also brought negative effects, where people were not quite 
ready for the changes (Bertrand, 2002). Therefore, a lot of conflict happened in Indonesia 
between 1998 and 2003, including the conflict in Ambon.  
There were strong assumptions that elites, who lost power after President Suharto 
fell on May 21, 1998, were responsible for creating the Ambon conflict. The Suharto 
government was supported by three pillars: the Golkar party, the military, and 
government bureaucracy. When President Suharto stepped down from his position, many 
of his cronies, the elite political and military leaders who relied on him, also lost 
influence, authority, and privilege. In order to get political power, it is believed that they 
attempted to show Indonesia that they still had power and influence by disturbing the 
process of democratization in Indonesia (International Crisis Group, 2000; Van Klinken, 
2001). 
In Ambon, there were multiple factors that influenced the conflict. The conflict 
did not suddenly happen, but was related to the complex history of Maluku. When the 
Dutch colonialized Ambon, they treated Christians and Muslims differently. The Dutch 
gave preference for Christians to become government administrators and military 
personnel, while Muslims were not allowed to work in government. This resulted in the 
Muslim population becoming more involved with the informal sectors of trade, farming, 
and fishery. Christians also were given privilege in education, and were encouraged to go 
	   50 
to school, while Muslims did not have as much access to education. Since Christians 
were singularly able to access higher education, when the Dutch needed educated 
workers to become government administrators, they would hire Christians. After 
Indonesia gained its independence from the Dutch, the social structure in Maluku did not 
change, and Christians continued to dominate the political and government structures, 
while Muslims were dominant in business and, as a result, were considered to be in 
control of the markets in Ambon.  
In the 1990s, Suharto created Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI) –– 
Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals ––to support his position, since he felt 
that he did not get enough support from the military alone. This organization then became 
dominant in the political constellation in Indonesia, and ICMI members filled many 
political and government posts in both central and local governments. ICMI gradually 
became a vehicle for many elites to get power, and this constellation affected the 
overarching political structure in Maluku province.  
For a long time, Christians were dominant in the structures of government, but 
this changed dramatically in 1993.  In 1993 there was a new Maluku governor, the first 
non-military governor of Maluku, M. Akib Latuconsina. He was both a Muslim and a 
member of the local ICMI in Ambon (van Klinken, 2007). During his period as governor, 
from 1993-1998, M. Akib Latuconsina dramatically changed the government structure. 
Government positions that used to be dominated by Christians began to be filled by 
Muslims. This change threatened Christian dominance, and this threat became obvious 
when the successor to the governor was also Muslim. Dr. M. Saleh Latuconsina was the 
Maluku governor from 1998-2003 and, coincidently, he was also member of ICMI. 
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During the period of these two governors, non-Maluku migrants from Bugis, Buton and 
Makasar also entered into strategic government positions (van Klinken, 2001). 
Tensions between Christians and Muslims in Ambon increased with the 
demographic changes. Even though migrants from Bugis, Buton and Makasar had been 
coming to Ambon since the sixteenth century, the migrant population in Ambon 
increased dramatically in the 1970s and 80s. During that period, the central government 
also had a policy, called transmigrasi, for sponsoring people from overpopulated areas 
such as Java, to migrate to less populated areas. Maluku became one of the tranmigrasi 
destinations and the increasing number of migrants in Ambon, who were mostly 
Muslims, changed the balance of Muslims and Christians in Ambon. Migrants from 
Bugis, Buton, and Makasar focused on trade and traditional markets, and they eventually 
dominated economics and traditional markets in Ambon. These dramatically changing 
demographics changed the political constellations in Ambon, and resulted in Muslims 
becoming dominant (Bertrand, 2002; International Crisis Group, 2000). 
 
Public Problems Post-conflict in Ambon 
 
One of the prominent post-conflict problems in Ambon is the social segregation 
between communities (International Crisis Group, 2011). The segregation has been a 
factor in Ambon since the colonialism period. International Crisis Group (2000) noticed 
that, “More than 300 years of Dutch colonialism divided Maluku society along religious 
lines” (as cited in Buchanan, 2011, p. 16). The segregation became wider after conflict 
happened in Ambon in 1999. Every member of each community knows exactly where the 
borders are between the Muslim and Christian communities. During conflict time, 
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Muslims were called “Acang” and “putih” (white) and Christians were called “Obet” and 
“merah” (red). Currently, people in Ambon use term “sebelah” or other side to refer to 
the other community. That word indicates that the segregation between two communities 
still remains (Map 2).  
 
Map 2: Ambon City Segregation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Christian Muslim Muslim spot 
 
In the short term, segregation helps to maintain peace and prevent mass 
communal conflict because there are clear lines between the communities that reduce 
contact and increase the effort required to attack the other community. It can be seen that 
after Ambon became completely segregated in 2002, there have been only two riots, in 
2004 and 2011. In the long term, the segregation leads to increase mistrust between the 
communities because there is not enough contact and communication. The segregation 
then is like a time bomb, which could result in riots and other violence at any time.  
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Reintegration and social cohesion activities have been attempted since the 
beginning of the conflict. There have been a lot of activities undertaken to minimize 
segregation, mostly conducted by NGOs and local government, including  the 
development planning process. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
conducted a Peace Through Development  (PTD) program to facilitate engagement and 
reconciliation between segregated communities through cultural activities, training, and 
capacity-building for local government staff. In practice, it offered only small 
opportunities for civic engagement among segregated villages.  
Any kind of public policy process in Ambon will touch directly or indirectly on 
issues of segregation or related segregation issues. Therefore, public policies in Ambon 
have the potential to exaggerate segregation among communities when the process of 
public policy focuses on specific communities.  
 
About Waringin 
 
Waringin is an area that is part of a Wainitu village, Sirimau Sub-district, Ambon 
City. Majority residents of the Wainitu village are Christians, yet in Waringin area there 
are some Muslims. Waringin is in the border area between Muslim communities and 
Christian communities and therefore, both Muslims and Christians live together. Before 
the conflict happened in 1999, people stayed mixed, and their neighborhoods included 
religious and ethnic diversity. Mostly people who stayed in Waringin are Bugis, Buton, 
Makasar, and Java ethnicity (who mostly are Muslim). However, there are also 
indigenous Amboneses, who are either Muslim or Christian (Map 3). 
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Map 3: Waringin Neighborhoods 
 
(source: http-/www.openstreetmap.org/?lat=-3.69768&lon=128.1682&zoom=16) 
 
 
 
History of Waringin in Ambon Conflict 
 
When the first conflict happened in Ambon January 19, 1999, Waringin became 
one of the high battlegrounds between both conflicting parties, Muslims and Christians. It 
happened due to Waringin’s geographical placement on the border between the two 
communities. Muslims mostly live near the coastal areas of Ambon City, while Christians 
typically stay far from coastal areas. When the conflict erupted, Christian’s came down 
toward the coastal areas while Muslims were moving in the opposite direction. Unluckily, 
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Waringin was at the point that the conflicting parties met, and where there was fierce 
fighting between them. As a result, all houses in Waringin were burned and flattened. 
The number of houses burned is uncertain, yet many people believe it was approximately 
200 – 300 houses.    
Waringin residents thought that the conflict would not be intense and violent, as 
did many Ambonese, because youth fighting between villages was common and never 
triggered mass violence around Ambon. Therefore, when Waringin was attacked and 
burned, people left their houses without preparation. Many of them had only the clothes 
on their back. Muslims and Christians suddenly became Internal Displace Persons 
(IDPs). Muslims ran to the nearest mosques and Christians went to churches. After 
several days, the Muslim IDPs stayed in emergency shelters in Taman Hiburan Remaja 
(THR) or youth garden, near the harbor, while Christians stayed in other Christian 
villages.  
More than a year after the Waringin residents became IDPs, in 2002 finally they 
came back and stayed in Waringin again. Even though, at that time, the situation in 
Ambon was generally still in conflict, they took the risk of coming back and staying in 
Waringin again because they were so enthusiastic to start their lives in Waringin. 
However, they could on stay in their house for a short time. Their “honeymoon” in 
Waringin, after suffering in the refugee shelters, ended when in the same year, 2002, they 
had to leave from their homes for the second time. The place became a battleground for 
conflicting parties, and arson once again caused their houses to be burned. For the second 
time, they became IDPs. Muslims returned to the shelters in THR, while Christians 
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stayed in Christian villages. This time, they were IDPs for approximately one year, before 
returning again to Waringin in 2003.  
 Conditions in Ambon in 2003 were mostly stable compared to the period from 
1999 to 2002. No more mass violence happened during 2003, even though there were 
sporadic events of gunfire and bombs in Ambon City. One reason the situation remained 
relatively peaceful was that the Malino II peace agreement was signed on February 2002. 
Buchanan (2011) mentions that, “Malino II was important in that it was a political 
statement that the conflict was considered officially concluded and that there was strong 
political will to reduce violence” (p.26). After the peace agreement was signed, the 
central government deployed more military and police in Ambon to guard the 
implementation of the agreement. Moreover, the peace agreement also became the 
foundation and guarantee for the central government to send money to the Maluku 
province to support recovery and reconstruction processes in Ambon.  
The number of conflict incidents in the Ambon area significantly decreased in 
2003. It was a secure year, compared to the period 1999 – 2002 (chart 1). The stable 
situation in Ambon led to the central government’s presidential decision on 7/1/2003 to 
revoke the civil emergency status of Maluku. This revocation was, effective from 
September 14, 2003, and had been imposed since June 27, 2000.  
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Chart 1: The number of conflict incidents in Ambon city 1998-2012 
 
Source: http://www.snpk-indonesia.com 
 
 
In 2003, the situation in Ambon was not fully peaceful, but it could be said to be 
secure and safe. This situation contributed to Waringin residents’ confidence in coming 
back to start their lives anew in Waringin. However, again, their lives became miserable 
when a riot in Ambon happened on April 25, 2004. The International Crisis Group (2004) 
wrote, “ The city of Ambon, in Maluku (Moluccas), which had been relatively quiet for 
two years, erupted in violence on 25 April 2004…” (p.1). 
The riot caused approximately 200 houses, owned by Muslims and Christians in 
Waringin, to be burned. The International Crisis Group (2004) mentions that, “In terms of 
arson, the worst hit areas were in the western parts of the city, the mostly Christian 
neighbourhoods of Waringin, Batu Gantong, and Talake, where hundreds of houses were 
burned” (p.4). Again for the third time, some Waringin residents became refugees. They 
went to the places they had used previously, Muslims stayed at shelters in THR or other 
places in Muslim communities, while Christians stayed in Christian communities. 
According to the International Crisis Group (2004), there were almost 10.000 people 
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displaced from their houses. (p.1). Even though the riot happened in one week, Waringin 
residents became refugees for almost one year before they came back to Waringin in 
2005. 
After the last riot in 2004, Ambon City gradually became calm again. People in 
Ambon moved forward step-by-step, continuing their lives and trying to bury their horror 
story of the conflict in 1999. This situation led to many improvements in the economic, 
social, educational, and other sectors. Data from the Statistics Bureau of Ambon Regional 
Office (2011) showed that income per capita in Ambon City from 2006 until 2010 
increased steadily (Chart 2).  
 
Chart 2: The Regional per Capita Income at Current Market Price and Constant 2000 
Market Price (Rupiah), 2006-2010 
  
Resource: Ambon In figures, Statistics Bureau of Ambon Regional Office, 2011 
 
Despite the renewed calm, on September 9, 2011 another riot happened 
suddnelyin Ambon City. There were 4,000 people displaced as a result of the violence, 
and some of the displaced had lost their houses for the fourth time in twelve years 
(International Crisis Groups, 2011, p. 1).  Again, for the fourth time, Waringin residents 
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were affected by the riots. This riot was relatively small compared to the riot in 2004 or 
the earlier conflicts.  
Anytime a riot would happen in Ambon, it would affect seriously Waaringin 
residents. The International Crisis Group (2011) explained that, “…Muslim houses in the 
Waringin area were set on fire. Because Waringin is a border area between the two 
communities, some Christian homes went up in flames as well” (p.3). All the riots and 
conflicts that happened in Ambon affected Waringin residents, even though the triggers 
always came from outside of the Waringin area. There were more than 100 houses in 
Waringin burned, mostly Muslims houses and 15 houses from Christian families, and 
more than 1.200 Waringin residents became refugees.  
 
First Reconstruction 
 
Four times Waringin was burned and flatted, and four times Waringin engaged in 
large scale reconstruction. The first reconstruction was after the conflict happened in 
January, 1999. However, the process of reconstruction and resettlement continued until 
2002, when Waringin residents finally came back to Waringin. Through funds from 
Maluku Province, the government took the initiative to rebuild houses for Waringin 
residents.  
Before the conflict in 1999, Waringin had a high-density population and was an 
slum area. The houses in Waringin varied in size and kind. Some houses were built from 
concrete, while others were from wood. When the area was burned, the concrete houses 
left some sign of their boundaries, yet the wood houses left no reminder of the boundaries 
of the houses.  
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Therefore, even though the burning and flattening of Waringin caused suffering 
for the residents, for the government it was a chance to rearrange the Waringin area to 
become well-organized and livable. When the government undertook the reconstruction 
of Waringin, it not only rebuilt houses but also created a consolidation program, which 
sought to improve the infrastructure in Waringin. The Public Works agency of Maluku 
Province created a plan with a consultant for the consolidation, and then presented it to 
the refugees in March, 1999.  
Through the consolidation program, the government built houses of the same size 
and style in the Waringin area. The government also reorganized the housing, providing 
paths and gutters in the area. According to Sudaryono and Suriadi (2011), there are four 
kinds of resettlement for refugees in Ambon: relocation from one source, relocation from 
various source, insertion, and improvement. Resettlement for Waringin refugees is 
classified as improvement because they came back to their original home areas to benefit 
from the government settlement system in that area. In the implementation of the 
consolidation program, the government gave authority to contractor companies, Adi 
Karya and Waskita Karya. During the planning and implementation, the government did 
not involve residents.  
The contractors flattened and demolished all burned houses in Waringin before 
starting to build new houses. Finally, the contractors built approximately 200 houses in 
Waringin in 2002 with a model that had one bedroom and one living room, without a 
bathroom. Because the houses did not have bathrooms, the government gave the residents 
approximately Rp. 300,000 or USD 30 to build their own bathroom.  
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After they finished with the houses, the contractors gave the houses to Waringin 
refugees. In this process, complaints and problems came up. Some people complained 
because the houses were smaller than their houses before. Moreover, some residents did 
not get houses even though they had houses in Waringin before the conflict. Other 
complaints were about where the houses were positioned, which the consolidation project 
had re-arranged when they rebuilt.  
The government actually created a small team of representative Waringin 
residents, which they called, “Team 12”. The members of the team were neighborhood 
leaders, youth leaders, and religious leader from both Muslim and Christian communities 
in Waringin. In the process of reconstruction, the government obtained useful 
information from Team 12. For instance, when the government had difficulty getting 
confirmation of house boundaries (because the Waringin refugees were staying in 
different places), they were able to obtain that information and confirmation from Team 
12.  
The team was not only a resource of information, but also a government partner in 
making agreements. Unfortunately, Team 12 and the reconstruction process were seen as 
exclusive due to the fact that there was no direct involvement of the residents. The team 
took over all residents’ rights as stakeholders in the public policy decision-making 
process. Because of the role that the Team assumed, the government did not 
communicate directly with Waringin refugees, and there were no public announcements 
from the government to the Waringin refugees about planning and implementation of the 
reconstruction policy.  
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When the residents complained about the process, implementation, or results of 
the reconstruction, they often blamed the government, the contractors, and also Team 12. 
The Waringin residents accused Team12 of not working properly, and not working on 
behalf of the people, and therefore asked to decommission the team. They agreed to 
create a new team, “Team 9,” which included 9 religious leaders, youth leaders, and 
neighborhood leaders.  
 
Second Reconstruction 
 
The second reconstruction of Waringin was in 2003, after the arson in 2002 and 
before the Malino II peace agreement was signed. It was not long before Waringin 
residents could return to Waringin, to new houses built by the government. All of the new 
houses from the reconstruction in 2002 were burned or damaged. As mentioned before, 
the first reconstruction created some new problems for the residents, such as the number 
and size of the houses and the nature of the facilities. When their houses were burned 
again, they got double the misery.  
The Maluku provincial government initiated the second reconstruction and 
renovation of the houses that had been destroyed. The reconstruction was again funded 
by the government, but this time the government did not build new houses for residents, 
but rather renovated the houses that they had already built. This was because they had 
previously built concrete houses, and the damages did not require full rebuilding of the 
houses. Moreover, with the problems from the first reconstruction still remaining, 
rebuilding houses might have created more problems.  
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In order to determine which houses had to be renovated, the government 
classified the damages, but this classification was not clear in indicators and definitions. 
The government didn’t explain the classification system to the refugees. However, 
according to the residents in Waringin in the one NGO’s documentation, the 
classifications were: high damage for the houses badly damaged but still able to be 
renovated; and small damage for minor damages, for instance, a broken window. In the 
second reconstruction process, the government just focused on the houses with high 
damage classification through a house renovation project, while for small damages the 
government did not do renovation.  
At the residents’ level, there was Team 9 to provide representation for the 
Waringin residents. The members of this team included neighborhood leaders, youth 
leaders, and religious leaders from the Waringin area. There was no direct 
communication between the refugees and government, because Team 9 took over the 
process, and communicated directly with the government. Team 9 provided information 
of the damages houses in Waringin to the government, however, Team 9 was not 
involved in the decision making process of damage classification. There was no forum 
between stakeholders to discuss or find solutions to the problems that arose during 
reconstruction.  
 Through the renovation program, the government gave building materials such as 
cement and wood to the residents. The government worked with a contractor company, 
Waskita Karya, to implement the reconstruction. The company provided the building 
materials for renovation. The residents got a coupon from the government that they could 
exchange for the materials. The government hoped that the residents would conduct their 
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own renovation of their houses. This system minimally answered one of the problems in 
the first reconstruction about the quality of the building, which was a common complaint 
from the residents. In another way, this system also gave freedom and creativity to the 
residents in their renovation process. In order to support the renovation processes, the 
government gave money (two million rupiah equal to USD 220) directly to residents.  
 
Third Reconstruction 
 
The third reconstruction of Waringin was in 2005, and rebuilt after the damage 
from the riot on April 25, 2004. There were approximately 100 houses burned. The 
problems from the first reconstruction were still not yet resolved in the second 
reconstructions, and then residents had to deal with the third reconstruction process. The 
residents of the Waringin area had no choice but to deal with the reconstruction processes 
because their properties there were all that they had.   
In the third reconstruction, the budget was from Maluku provincial government. 
Through the social affairs agency, the provincial government conducted the 
reconstruction process. The reconstruction was not much different from the previous one 
that took place in 2003. In this reconstruction, the government also did a renovation 
program. Without clear indicators, the government decided which of the houses would 
get renovated.  
During this renovation program, there was no team representing residents, as 
there had been in the first and second reconstructions. The government directly met with 
neighborhood leaders to get information and clarification about the number of houses 
damaged and the level of the damage. The neighborhood leaders then managed the 
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administrative steps, and processed evidence from the residents to help them get 
renovation assistance from the government. When the evidence and the administrative 
requirements were adequate, the government gave coupons to the neighborhood leaders 
to give to the residents. The residents exchanged their coupons for building materials, 
such as tin roofs, woods and cements. At this time, the government did not involve 
contractor companies in the renovation implementation, as they had in the first and 
second reconstructions. The implementation was conducted directly by the social affairs 
agency from the Maluku province. Another difference of the third reconstruction from 
the other reconstructions was that the government did not give money for the bricklayer 
fees. The residents were left with the responsibility to pay for bricklaying.  
 
Fourth Reconstruction 
 
The fourth reconstruction started in November 2011. After the riot on September 
9, 2011, displaced Muslim residents of Waringin stayed at the Silale elementary school 
building, and displaced Christina residents of Waringin stayed at the Tax office building. 
Because the elementary school building was needed for students in October 2011, the 
government asked the refugees who stayed at the elementary school building to move to 
Pasar Gotong Royong (Gotong Royong market building), while the displaced Christians 
still stayed at the tax building office.  
As a pattern of evacuation, the refugees were still segregated and divided by the 
religious differences. Muslims used Muslim networks, gathering in the mosques before 
they moved to their shelter, while Christians went to the nearest churches before moving 
to the shelters in Christian communities. From their evacuation patterns, it can be seen 
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that mistrust among people with different religions in Ambon still remained, especially 
when the riot happened.  
The government was proactive, starting from their emergency response after the 
riot. Even though they were not directly involved in the evacuation process, they 
coordinated and provided shelters, humanitarian aid, sanitation, and other basic 
necessities for the displaced. They not only provided for basic needs, but also initiated 
communication directly with the refugees. One week after the riot, the government 
collected data about refugees, damages, and other information that was related to the 
emergency response. The government used the military office in Ambon as a place for 
meetings, which showed that the government wanted to create a neutral and safe place for 
both Christians and Muslims who came to participate.  
In order to facilitate communication between refugees and government, the 
Ambon City district created Posko pengungsi (coordination post of refugees), which 
collected and distributed aid, food and other refugees needs. Anytime there were 
problems in shelters, for instance problems with sanitation, water, and electricity, 
refugees could directly contact posko pengungsi. After the emergency response period, 
the government used posko pengungsi as a forum for all stakeholders to come and discuss 
issues of reconstruction in Waringin.  
The Posko pengungsi, in partnership with public works government agencies, 
military, police, social affairs government agencies and transportation government 
agencies, then conducted a research in the Waringin area. Through their observations and 
surveys, the posko pengungsi collected information about the damages, people’s concerns 
of reconstruction, and security issues. In order to update information and facilitate 
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communication, the posko pengungsi conducted weekly meetings. These meetings were 
open to the public, allowing stakeholders of the reconstruction at Waringin to come 
together. The weekly meetings were used to reconfirm and update information, receive 
complaints from stakeholders, and seek solutions. Additional meetings could be 
scheduled anytime there was information available to inform the residents.  
The government classified the damage of the houses in Waringin in three levels: 
total damage meant the building was totally ruined and needed to be rebuilt; high damage 
meant the houses were badly damaged, however, they could be renovated; and the last 
classification was small damage, for the houses with minor damage. The indicators of 
this classification were not so clear and mostly depended on government agencies’ 
expertise. From the classification, the government declared it would give 59 million 
rupiah or approximately USD 6,200 for total damage: 24 million rupiah or USD 2,600 for 
high damage; and 5 million rupiah or USD 520 for small damage. The money came from 
three resources: district, provincial and central government budgets, with the majority 
coming from The State Ministry of Housing and The Ministry of Social Affairs. 
The government gave money directly to people for renovating their houses by 
themselves. The government gave this money in three phases. The first distribution was 
about 14 million rupiah equal to USD 1,500. The second phase was 17 million rupiah or 
about USD 1,800. The last amount was 26 million or about USD 2,700. For small and 
high damages, all money was distributed in the fist term and second term. However, for 
total damage they are still waiting for the third term, which has just this year been 
received. For the first and second term, the money was from the province and the central 
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government through The Ministry of Social Affairs. For the third term the money came 
from central government, also through The State Ministry of Housing.  
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Methods 
 
The question driving this research asks how the civic engagement processes can 
pave the way for collaborative governance in post-conflict societies. Through that 
question, this research seeks to know how the public policy processes in Ambon City 
have engaged civic participation, and to assess the readiness of government and people in 
Ambon to apply collaborative governance approaches.  Because this question seeks to 
describe a process, a qualitative approach is the most suitable method for inquiry. Case 
study research was selected as the methodology both because of my familiarity with and 
expertise about the conflict scenario in Ambon, Indonesia, and also because of the type of 
data I have access to about the conflict itself, and about the efforts that have transpired in 
its aftermath.  Moreover, especially in this thesis, case study research was chosen as a 
way to make a meaningful contribution to the field.  Case study research can effectively 
interrogate real problems from the field and create the findings and recommendations that 
can answer those real problems in the field.  
The literature that was reviewed in Chapter II discusses the nature and practice of 
civic participation, civic engagement, and collaborative governance. These processes are 
all vital elements that contribute to a functional and participative democracy, and from 
that, an increased potential for sustainable peace. The literature review concludes with a 
model of diagonal civic engagement and peace-focused collaborative governance, which 
describes the key characteristics of the process of collaboration. This model, illustrated in 
Table 1, is used as a rubric to analyze the case study data about Ambon, Indonesia, and 
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serves to document the nature and quality of participation in moving from a conflict 
scenario into a post-conflict reality.  
The evaluative rubric of diagonal civic engagement and peace-focused 
collaborative governance for post-conflict areas is separated into three components of 
analysis: tools, processes, and relationships. The data from this case study will be 
analyzed through examining what tool was used, what process was engaged, and what 
significant relational aspects were present. The mode of diagonal civic engagement and 
peace-focused collaborative governance requires public processes as instruments or tools 
to engage people. The data from the case study will be analyzed to determine how the 
tool of civic engagement was used in the process of developing public policy. The second 
component of analysis is assessing the processes used to develop public policy, looking at 
whether and how the process engaged a neutral forum and how formal/structured or 
informal/unstructured the processes were. Next, the relational component of analysis will 
focus on analyzing the inclusivity of the process, the frequency of direct contacts, and the 
level of inter-group engagement. 
 
Table 1: Evaluative Rubric: Diagonal Civic Engagement and Peace-Focused 
Collaborative Governance 
Tool Public Process 
Process Neutral Forum, Formal Structure 
Relationship Inclusive, Direct Contact, Inter-Group 
Engagement 
 
 
The case that is examined in this research involves the Waringin neighborhood 
(kampung) of the city of Ambon, on the island of Ambon, within the Moluccas Islands of 
Indonesia. Waringin was selected for the case study because of its unique position at the 
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border between Muslim and Christian communities, and its mix of people from the two 
different communities. The other reasons it was selected are because of the intensity of 
conflict in this area, the multiple reconstruction processes that have been documented 
over the course of the conflict, and the depth of data that is available about how (and if) 
the government engaged the population in the processes surrounding the reconstructions. 
In addition, I have worked in this area, so, where appropriate, my own observations will 
be used to expand upon the data presented in the analysis.  
The data collection strategies used in this research project primarily include 
document review, and also include some observation from personal involvement. 
Documents reviewed for this case study include articles from local newspapers, program 
reports from multiple Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in Ambon, maps from 
multiple sources, meeting minutes from NGOs and government staff, and presentation 
slides from government staff. In addition, transcripts from interviews conducted by 
NGOs with NGO and government staff in Ambon, are used to triangulate the document 
review data, helping to establish validity and accuracy in the findings.  
 
Data 
 
Data has been collected from various sources. The data from newspapers is 
mostly from the newspaper website in Ambon. During the Ambon conflict, newspapers 
were divided and labeled as either Christian or Muslim newspapers. In order to get 
balanced reports, I collected news from the Ambon Express, which during the conflict 
was labeled as a Muslim newspaper, and the Siwa Lima, which was labeled as a Christian 
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newspaper. From both newspapers, I gathered data about the Ambon conflict, refugee 
issues, and reconstruction issues.  
I also collected data from some NGOs in Ambon. Because the case study in this 
research is about the reconstruction processes in the Waringin area, Ambon City, most 
data was collected from NGOs that worked in the Waringin area. The Tifa Damai 
Foundation, through its Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System (CEWERS) 
program, provided a program report that updated the Ambon situation every three 
months. Those documents mostly related to the Ambon conflict, and discussed civil 
participation in public policy, refugee issues, the reconstruction process, and provided a 
map of segregated Ambon. Through the organization’s report there are documents from 
government agencies about the number of refugees, houses burned, government strategy 
for reconstruction, and civil participation. From that NGO, there are also documents of 
some interviews from Waringin refugees (Muslims and Christians) and village leaders. I 
also collected data from the NGO, Lembaga Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Anak 
(LAPPAN), which worked in the Waringin areas. The sources include an interview report 
from the meeting with government agencies about the reconstruction process in 
Waringing and reports on the activities of the organization’s program in Waringin. In 
order to get more information about Ambon from NGOs, some other data was collected 
from Mercy Corp Indonesia in Ambon, the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) with the Peace Through Development program and partnership. Since I have 
worked in Ambon City, I gathered updated information from NGO staff in Ambon about 
the reconstruction processes, and civic involvement processes.  
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From the government, some data was taken from village leaders about the map of 
Waringin, the demographic data of Waringin, and information about how people were 
represented in the reconstruction processes. Data was also collected from Badan 
Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Daerah (BAPEDA) or the Regional development 
planning agency of Ambon City about vision, mission, development planning, and the 
strategy of Ambon City. Also, a city map of Ambon was acquired.  
Some documents were compiled from literature and research related to the public 
policy process and the resettlement program in Ambon. In order to better understand the 
security dynamic, and the number of conflict incidents in Ambon, this research also 
looked at data from the National Violence Monitoring System Indonesia (NVMS). Some 
data was obtained from Badan Pusat Statistic (BPS) of Ambon City, or the central bureau 
of statistics of Ambon, who provided data about the social and economical situation in 
Ambon. 
 
Analysis 
 
As I read through the data, it became clear that the most common and relevant 
topics were reconstruction and participation. I grouped the data into these two topics, and 
developed sub-topics that represented the variables that helped to describe the level of 
civic engagement and collaborative governance that emerged in the post-conflict 
environment.  
The data related to the reconstruction topic was then classified into three sub 
topics: first, according to the time of reconstruction (first and second reconstructions, and 
reconstruction in post-conflict time; third and fourth reconstruction processes); second, 
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according to the type of reconstruction (full reconstruction or rebuilding for the first 
reconstruction, and renovation for the second, third and fourth reconstructions); and third, 
according to the relations between parties or stakeholders during the reconstruction 
process. These parties were government agencies, contractors, and residents who were 
the recipients of the public services. 
 In terms of participation, the data fell into three sub-topics. First, the sub-topic of 
how much representation people had in the reconstruction process, was divided into two 
variables: elected and non-elected representation. Second, the stakeholders’ forum, which 
broke down into a regular forum and a non-stakeholder forum. The last sub-topic under 
participation is the form of participation: first, inform, in which government just informs 
stakeholder groups about what they want to do, second, involve, where the government 
not only gives information to people but also gets input and involves people in the public 
policy processes, and third, engage, which describes government as using interactive 
communication with people and also integrally involving people in their processes.  
 
Table 2: Topics and Subtopics 
Topics and Subtopics 
Reconstruction 
Reconstruction Processes 
 Conflict 
 Post-conflict 
Types of Reconstruction 
 Reconstruction 
 Renovation 
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Reconstruction Involvement 
 Government – Contractors – Residents as target of public services 
 Government – Contractors – Residents involved in implementation 
 Government – Government Agencies – Residents involved in implementation 
 Government – Residents as Active Implementers 
Participation 
 Representation of people in Reconstruction Process 
 Not elected: Team 12, not elected in first reconstruction. 
 Elected: Team 9, elected by the community for second reconstruction, 
Neighborhood leaders, (elected by the people) for third reconstruction, and 
Badan Keswadayaan Masyarakat (council for community self-support) for fourth 
reconstruction. 
Stakeholder forum  
  No stakeholder’s forum for first, second and third reconstructions.  
  Stakeholder’s forum for fourth reconstruction.  
 Participation form  
  Inform, for first reconstruction.  
  Involve, for second and third reconstruction.  
  Engage, for fourth reconstruction.  
 
In the analysis process, the data was identified and classified according to topic. 
Topical data was then clustered into categories. In examining the categories of the data, 
patterns emerged. An explanation of the patterns was then used as findings, which serve 
to answer the research question.  
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Limitations 
 
There is limited literature available on civic engagement and collaborative 
governance in post-conflict areas. For the most part, the literature about civic engagement 
and collaborative governance applies to areas without violent conflict. Moreover, there 
are variations in the focus of how civic engagement and collaborative governance are 
studied, and therefore the definitions of these terms vary. Furthermore, due to the fact 
that the field of collaborative governance is nascent, there is still an ongoing effort to 
define and structure the concepts and practices involved. Because of these zimitations, 
my strategy was to use collaborative governance within the form of spectrum 
collaborative governance (Carlson, 2007; Shinna, & Singer, 2012). The literature review 
arrives at an operative model of civic engagement and collaborative governance for post-
conflict areas.  
Another limitation of this study is the data collection process. This research is 
about the public policy process in the reconstruction process in Ambon City, Indonesia. 
The reconstructions occur from 1999 to 2011. This long period presents difficulty in 
getting integrated data, especially related to the reconstruction process during the period 
of conflict. In order to overcome this limitation, I used documents from NGOs and 
government agencies, supplemented by my own experiences working in the area. In order 
to minimize bias, I rechecked the data with NGOs and some people in Ambon City.  
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CHAPTER V 
FINDINGS 
 
This chapter focuses on what I found from the data that I compiled about the public 
policy process during Waringin’s reconstruction events between 2002 and 2011. I 
describe the differences among the four reconstruction processes and the effect on civic 
participation in the public policy process. This chapter ends with an analysis of the 
reconstruction process in Waringin through the model of diagonal civic engagement and 
peace-concerned collaborative governance.  
 
Reconstructions 
 
Reconstruction Process and Conflict Situation 
 
The data reviewed in this research indicated that the process of reconstruction in 
Waringin could be divided into two main parts: the reconstruction process during the 
conflict period, before the Malino II peace agreement, and the reconstructions during the 
post-conflict period, after the peace agreement was signed. The Malino II peace 
agreement became a sign to distinguish between the conflict period and the post-conflict 
period, because the agreement was a turning point in the situation, and in the number of 
conflict incidents in Ambon (Buchanan, 2011). The first Waringin reconstruction, 2001-
2002, was classified as reconstruction in the conflict period, while the second, third and 
fourth reconstructions were classified as the reconstructions post-conflict.  
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Reconstruction During the Conflict 
The reconstruction process during the conflict period was driven by a sense of 
emergency response, which resulted in very low amounts of civic engagement in public 
policy development. The central government on 26 June, 2000 decided to impose a civil 
emergency law for Maluku, through President decision no. 88, 2000. Since Maluku was 
under civil emergency law, according to the law 32 /1959, the local government leaders 
had the authority to take any actions necessary to prevent the Maluku and Ambon 
situations from getting worse. Applying this law affected the public policy process 
directly, undermining, in the name of the emergency, the involvement of members of the 
community in the public policy process. On one side, local government activities in 
Ambon mostly focused on providing and distributing emergency and humanitarian aid, 
shelter, and other basic needs for the people rather than involving people in the public 
policy process.  On the other side, humanitarian aid was a priority for the people. The life 
of refugees relied on humanitarian aid.  
Moreover, security and safety issues were also more of a concern for the people 
of Waringin than was participation in the public policy process. Security reasons led to 
Waringin refugees staying in different shelters, either in Muslim shelters or Christian 
shelters. Security concerns affected the involvement of people in the public policy 
process, because people were afraid to leave their area or meet with people from different 
communities. According to Carlson (2007), collaborative governance processes are not 
suitable when stakeholders are not able to devote enough concentration, time, and energy 
to participate (p.22). 
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During the period of conflict, there was the assumption that the refugees or 
victims of the conflict were people who did not have the capacity to participate actively 
in public policy deliberations, that they were powerless and vulnerable and therefore 
needed to be helped. This assumption led the government to provide what the people 
needed but minimize the involvement of community members in the public policy 
deliberative process.  
In the first Waringin reconstruction, the government came to the Waringin 
refugees’ shelters with money and ideas for reconstruction, and explained the 
reconstruction project to the refugees. The government offered a consolidation program 
for the Waringin area, reorganizing neighborhoods to be in better functional condition. 
Moreover, the Waringin refugees were focused primarily on how they could have their 
houses again, and how to do it quickly.  Therefore, the government reconstruction 
program was accepted without any other choices, even though the public did not really 
understand the consolidation program and the effects this program would have on their 
houses and land. The Waringin people just understood that the government would build 
houses and reorganize the area to make better conditions. The state of emergency frame 
of reference from both the government and the people of Waringin resulted in the first 
reconstruction process being conducted very fast and with little involvement of 
community members.  
Reconstruction After the Conflict 
In contrast, the reconstruction processes of the Waringin neighborhoods in the 
post-conflict era moved toward involving more people in the process. The increase in 
pubic involvement was the result of several factors. The first and the biggest factor was 
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the signing of the Malino II peace agreement in February 2002. There were eleven points 
in the peace agreement, and point number 8 of the peace agreement clearly mentioned 
reconstruction of the housing, “ Rehabilitation mental, social, economic and public 
infrastructures, particularly educational, health, religious and housing facilities.” 
(Buchanan, 2011, p.26). There is no express provision for community involvement spelt 
out in the Malino II peace agreement but including point 8 clearly showed that the 
reconstruction of houses in post-conflict in Ambon was par of the agenda for the 
conflicting parties in Ambon and Indonesia as a whole. .  The Malino II peace agreement 
is an agreement between two conflicting parties, Muslim and Christian communities in 
Ambon, while the government was a facilitator for the process.  Therefore, all points in 
the peace agreement are an agreement between two communities, or agenda for both 
parties. Since Reconstruction is one of the points in the peace agreement. It means the 
reconstruction is agenda of communities in Ambon. Because the reconstruction is people 
agenda, it leads to people enthusiast participate in the reconstruction process.  
Through this agreement, the local government in Ambon got more attention from 
the central government. On 21 September 2003, through president instruction no 6, the 
central government initiated the recovery process of post-conflict Ambon. The 
presidential instruction was then followed by a supporting budget from the central 
government for reconstruction and recovery. Of course, the budget was just one part of 
the reconstruction processes, but it was important because of the dire economic 
conditions in Ambon after the conflict, and the local government was reliamt on such 
support from the central government. Political and economic support from the central 
government helped the local government in Ambon conduct the reconstruction processes; 
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however, ample government support also became a stumbling block because there was 
less of an obvious need for civic involvement. The only way that the population of 
Waringin found to participate in the process was to insist that the reconstruction 
processes be transparent.  
The second reason for the changing public involvement was the impact of the 
peace agreement on security issues in Ambon. Data from National Violence Monitoring 
System Indonesia (NVMS) shows that conflict incidents in Ambon from 2002 to 2003 
decreased significantly (see chart 1). That situation affected people in Ambon involved in 
public policy processes.  Feeling more safety led to greater confidence to ask, criticize, 
express concerns and generally to be involved in the reconstruction process. On the other 
side, the changing security situation also made local government change the ways it 
engaged with people in the reconstruction process, giving more space for people’s 
involvement.  
The third reason for increased civic engagement by the people is the role of media 
in the reconstruction and rehabilitation processes in Ambon. After the peace agreement 
was signed, Ambon got much attention from national and local media. The news and 
cover issues related to reconstruction and recovery became dominant in the local media 
and some national media. The media coverage helped people in Ambon understand the 
process of reconstruction in Ambon. The media also helped the government understand 
the problems and concerns of people in the reconstruction process. Sometimes, the media 
also facilitated and amplified the voice of the people to local government. For instance, 
the Ambon Express newspaper had a column for people’s voices. Every month, the 
newspaper facilitated meetings and invited the government agencies to elicit responses 
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and answers to the problems raised in the column. Then the responses from government 
agencies were published in the newspaper. Therefore people could receive answers to 
their problems from the government in the newspaper.  
 
Kinds of Reconstruction 
 
The data in this research showed there were two kinds of reconstruction 
approaches in Waringin, which influenced the different ways people were involved in the 
reconstruction process. The first reconstruction was a complete rebuilding of houses. The 
second, third and fourth Waringin reconstructions, 2002, 2004, and 2011, included 
renovation approaches. 
Renovation approaches answered the different needs in Waringin because people 
could renovate their houses according to their needs. Renovation approaches gave more 
opportunity for civic involvement because the renovations were conducted by each 
householder involved. Moreover, since there were different damages, the government 
needed information and evidence from the people in the assessment process to decide 
level of damages, therefore, the government had to involve people in the assessment 
process.  
From the second reconstruction until the fourth reconstruction there was a gradual 
change toward more involvement of the people in the process. The renovation strategies 
influenced how people were involved in the process. In the second reconstruction, the 
renovation strategy was for the government to involve contractors to provide building 
materials for people. This strategy was more bureaucratic because people had to 
communicate with the government and contractors to get building materials. In the third 
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reconstruction, the strategy was slightly different, and allowed for more involvement. It 
was more simple than the second reconstruction in that people just connected with the 
government to get building materials directly from the government agencies without 
having to involve independent contractors. In the fourth reconstruction, the renovation 
strategy became even more simple, with people communicating to the government about 
the assessment and updating about problems during the reconstruction process. In this 
case, the government did not provide building materials but gave money directly to 
Badan Keswadayaan Masyarakat (BKM), the self-supporting community council, to 
manage the renovation process itself. This process required people to engage with other 
people from different groups because the council was created and populated by people 
from both Muslim and Christian neighborhoods. This change in strategy shows the 
government and the people used their experiences from the previous reconstruction 
process to improve the next reconstruction process, particularly in terms of citizen 
participation.  
 
Relations Among the Parties in the Reconstruction Process 
 
The data reveals the different types of relationships that existed among those 
directly involved in the reconstruction process. The categorization of parties involved in 
the reconstruction gradually changed, from three main parties being involved in the first 
and second reconstructions, to primarily two parties in the third and fourth 
reconstructions. Changing the number of parties in the reconstruction process also 
changed the relationships among parties. The more direct the relations were between 
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people and the government, the more people became involved in the public policy 
process.  
The three parties in the first and second reconstructions included the government, 
contractors, and the Waringin people. In the first reconstruction, relationships were one-
directional, with the government delegating authority to contractors to conduct planning 
and implement the reconstruction process. When the contractors were done with 
implementation, they gave the houses to the people. The relations here can be described 
as vertical with the government on the top, the contractor in the middle, and on the 
bottom, the Waringin people. There was no direct communication between the 
government and the people nor was there much communication from the people to the 
contractors. There was also no two-way communication between parties (See Figure 3).  
In the second reconstruction, the parties remained the same; however, relations were 
different from the first reconstruction. In the second reconstruction, there were direct 
vertical relations between the government and people. The contractors in this schema 
were the third parties. Their role was only to help the government provide building 
materials for people, and there was direct communication between the government and 
the people. 
In the third and fourth reconstructions, there were two primary parties: the 
government and the Waringin people. The two parties’ relations were more direct than 
was the case with the three parties in the previous reconstruction processes. The direct 
relations between the government and the Waringin people in the third reconstruction 
was still vertical in that the government still took a lead and dominant role, and the 
Waringin people had opportunities to be involved in the process. The communication 
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between the government and the Waringin people was not only in one direction from the 
government to the people, but two-way.  
The biggest change was in the fourth reconstruction process. The relation between 
the government and Waringin people was direct and more horizontal in nature. The role 
of the government in the fourth reconstruction was more as a facilitator of the process 
than as the decision-maker. The budget of reconstruction was from the central and 
provincial governments, and Ambon City worked with the people in a participative way 
to assess the level of house damage. The renovation money was directly transferred to 
people through their self-supporting community council. In this council, people managed 
the money by themselves. Through this council, people in Waringin from different 
backgrounds, both Muslims and Christians, mingled and engaged with one another. The 
relationships and trust between the government and people were building since the 
reconstruction process started. Initially, the government had only involved people in the 
house damage assessment process, but it had started consulting with the public during 
evacuations, preparing shelters for people, and proactively solving refugees issues.  
The choice of approach, either reconstruction or renovation, affected the 
relationships among the parties. Table 1 shows that a reconstruction approach affects the 
relations among the parties in one direction from government to people. The renovation 
approach gives more opportunity for involving people in the reconstruction process and 
therefore, the relations are more two-way than one. 
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Table 3: The relation parties in Waringin reconstruction  
First 
reconstruction 
Consolidation  
Second reconstruction 
Renovation  
Third 
reconstruction 
Renovation  
Fourth 
reconstruction 
Renovation  
 
Government 
 
 
Contractors 
 
 
Waringin people 
 
 
Government  contractors 
 
 
 
Waringin people  
 
Government – 
(government 
Agencies) 
 
 
Waringin people 
 
Gov          Waringin 
people 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participation 
 
People Representation in the Reconstruction Process 
 
From the data gathered, there was evidence that the Waringin people were always 
involved in relationships with the government during the reconstructions processes. The 
representatives, either elected or non-elected, had the role of connector between the 
government and people. However, that role was changing gradually from one 
reconstruction process to another, from an amplifier of the government’s agenda to a 
communicator of the people’s agendas.  
Elected representatives brought two-way communication between the government 
and the people, while un-elected representatives mostly facilitated one-way 
communication from government to people. This was because un-elected representation 
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was created by the government, and therefore the representatives worked for the 
government rather than for the people.  In the first reconstruction, the Team 12 was 
mostly a “microphone” for the government rather than representative of the voices of the 
people to the government. In contrast, because the elected representatives were elected by 
the people, they worked to facilitate the voices of people to communicate with the 
government. Elected representatives were elected by the people because they trusted that 
the representatives knew the problems in the field, and therefore could articulate the 
people’s needs when they communicated with the government.  
Through elected representatives, the level of involvement of the people in the 
reconstructions process was also relatively higher than in the reconstruction process with 
un-elected representation. On one side, the elected representatives could articulate the 
people’s needs and concerns when they communicated with the government. On the other 
side, the elected representatives could also facilitate communication from the government 
to the people. Because they were elected, they knew how to talk with the people who 
chose them, and therefore they could minimize misunderstanding and 
miscommunication. There was active two-way communication between the people and 
their representatives. As a result, every step of the reconstruction processes could be 
monitored by people through updated information from their representatives, and if there 
were problems in the field, people could speak to the government indirectly through their 
representatives. 
However, even among elected representatives there were differences in the way 
that civil participation operated. Even though in the second and third reconstructions 
there were elected representatives, the relationships between the government and the 
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people were channeled through the representatives and there was no direct 
communication. It was different in the fourth reconstruction because, though 
representatives continued to work between the government and the people, there were 
opportunities for direct communication. The BKM was facilitating communication 
between the people and the government related to the administrative, technical, and 
financial issues. On other issues related to the reconstruction process, however, people 
could directly inform or be informed by the government. There were also weekly direct 
meetings between people and the government to update information among them. If there 
was a gap in information from the government, people could directly ask the government 
to explain.  
 
Table 4: The people representations relations  
First 
reconstruction 
Second 
reconstruction 
Third 
reconstruction 
Fourth 
reconstruction 
 
The government 
 
 
Team 12 
 
 
Waringin people 
 
The government 
 
 
Team 9 
 
 
Waringin people 
 
The government 
 
 
Neighborhoods 
leaders 
 
Waringin people 
 
The government 
 
 
BKM 
 
 
Waringing people 
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Stakeholders Forum 
 
The participation of the Waringin people in the reconstruction processes can be 
measured on the basis of whether there were any stakeholder forums or not. The 
stakeholder forum, a key component of civic participation, is a public forum that involves 
all stakeholders in a process,  including the people affected by the process. From the data 
collected, the stakeholder forums gave more opportunity for people to participate in the 
reconstruction process. The representatives of the people did not automatically indicate 
that a stakeholder forum would take place.  
The un-elected representatives tended to minimize the possibility of the 
stakeholder forum. This could be seen in the first reconstruction, in which the 
representation was mostly used by the government to communicate with the people and 
therefore, the government did not open space for the voice of the people. Creating 
stakeholder forums requires participants to have an open mind and willingness to accept 
contradictory input, critics, concerns, opinions, and two-way communication from all 
stakeholders. In the first reconstruction, when the government was not open to the 
possibility of two-way communication, this was an indication that the government was 
not ready to create a stakeholders forum. Moreover, as mentioned in the first part of this 
chapter, the emergency response focus of the process did not prioritize the creation of a 
stakeholder forum.  
The presence of elected representatives later in the process was not a guarantee 
for the use of a stakeholder forum in the reconstruction process. In the second, third, and 
fourth reconstructions, there were elected representatives, yet only in the fourth 
reconstruction was there a stakeholder forum. In the two first, there was two-way 
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communication between the government and the people, but there was no forum for all 
stakeholders to regularly discuss and share information in order to solve their problems. 
In contrast, in the fourth reconstruction, even though there were elected representatives, 
the government created a stakeholder forum, pos kordinasi pengungsi (posko pengungsi), 
or a coordination post for refugees which conducted weekly meetings involving multiple 
government agencies and refugees. Through the meetings, people could update 
information from the field and ask for explanations or comments from the government, 
while the government could explain the process and update information from the current 
situation in the field.  
Through the stakeholder forum, communication between the government and 
people not only happened in two-way directions, but the forum created an opportunity for 
proactive communication among stakeholders to solve the reconstruction process 
problems. Therefore, the presence of the stakeholder forum positively affected the 
involvement of people in the public policy process.  
 
Participation Form 
 
Participation of people in the reconstruction processes in Waringin could also be 
measured or evaluated through the form of their participation (see Table 3). From the 
data, we can sketch three kinds of participation: inform, involve, and engage. The first 
kind of participation can be termed inform, where the communication only happens in a 
one-way direction from the government to the people, with no communication from the 
people to the government. This was characteristic of the first reconstruction process, 
when the government came to the Waringin refugees’ shelter to explain the planning of 
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Waringin reconstruction through the consolidation approach. There was no dialogue or 
space for people to give comment or input on the government plan. In this case, the 
government just informed the people about the plan of the public policy process. From 
that communication, the government hoped that people understood the reconstruction 
process. Even though, in the first reconstruction, the government received approval from 
people for the reconstruction plan, that was not the main goal for giving the presentation 
and did not determine whether the plan was implemented or not.  
A second form of participation by the people in the reconstruction process was 
involvement. This could be seen in the data from the second and the third reconstructions. 
The government conducted communication in a two-way format, in which the people 
were more involved through giving information. An example of involvement was when 
the people participated in the assessment process to classify the level of house damages. 
The government did not only rely on the people’s representatives, but the government 
agencies came to hear from the people in the field. Another example of involvement of 
the people in the reconstruction process was the active participation in the 
implementation of the renovation process. People did the renovations themselves, and 
therefore they could decide what, when, and how the renovation would be done. Through 
self-renovation, the people could fulfill the needs of the renovation for their homes.  
The third form of participation for the people of Waringin in the reconstruction 
process can be termed engagement, which could be seen in the fourth reconstruction. 
Engagement gives more space for people’s participation in public policy process. This 
form could be seen through the fourth reconstruction process, in which the government 
and the people actively engaged far before the reconstruction process started. People and 
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government together conducted assessments and decided the levels of house damage. 
Every week, through the stakeholder’s forum, government and people updated 
information on problems and successes of the reconstruction process. Decisions were 
arrived at jointly about how to proceed. 
 
Table 5: The kind of participations  
First 
reconstruction 
Second 
reconstruction 
Third 
reconstruction 
Fourth 
reconstruction 
 
Inform 
 
Involve 
 
Involve 
 
Engage 
 
Diagonal Civic Engagement and Peace-Focused Collaborative Governance 
 
If the four reconstruction periods are evaluated through the model of diagonal 
civic engagement and peace-focused collaborative governance, we can see the range of 
stakeholder involvement and civic engagement as is presented in figure 4.  The Waringin 
reconstruction processes were public policy processes because the problems related to 
government services and involved people as stakeholders of the problem. Moreover, the 
policies that were developed and implemented directly or indirectly affected the citizens. 
The public policies of the reconstruction process could be divided into those developed 
during the conflict period and those during the post-conflict period.  
The process of public policy in the conflict period was characterized as top down 
from the government to the people. There was no neutral stakeholder forum or other 
stakeholder involvement. The process was formal, structured, and conducted by the 
government without involvement people in the process.  
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During the post-conflict period, the process of reconstructions gradually changed. 
In the second and third reconstructions, there were no neutral forums, but there was two-
way communication between the government and people. In the fourth reconstruction, 
the process was broadened to include a stakeholder forum, even if it could not be named 
a neutral forum because it was created by the government and the agenda of the forum 
depended on the government agencies that managed the forum rather than an agenda 
created by all stakeholders.   
In terms of relationships, among all reconstruction process there was variation 
that gradually changed from one reconstruction to the next. In the first reconstruction, 
relations were exclusive because the government only communicated with Team 12, not 
directly with people as stakeholders. Moreover, through the consolidation program the 
reconstruction process was only conducted by the government, and in the implementation 
process it was only conducted by contractors. People just received the results of the 
reconstruction process, by which they got new houses. Since the process was centralized 
in the government authority, there was no direct contact between people and the 
government, or between Christians and Muslims. As a result, there was no process of 
intergroup civic engagement.  
 In the second and third reconstructions, it was a semi-inclusive process by 
involving people in the process through their representatives. The direct communication 
between the government and people happened only in the assessment process of the 
house damage levels. After that assessment, the process took place mostly between the 
government and the representatives, even though there was intense two-way 
communication between people with their representatives. Therefore, it was semi-
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inclusive in the second and third reconstructions. Through intense communication 
between the representatives and the people, there was small chance for inter-group 
engagement because the process of communication was not conducted in an inclusive 
forum. Since there was no forum for the representatives and the people, there was small 
chance for Christians and Muslims to meet together. As a result there was minimum 
inter-group civic engagement.  
The significant difference in the fourth reconstruction process was the addition of 
a stakeholder forum in the process. This forum led to open and direct contact, not only 
between the people and the government, but also between people from the Muslim and 
Christian communities. However, direct contact among people from the two communities 
was quite minimum because, in the process, the government did not intentionally use the 
reconstruction process as the way to build engagement between people. The government 
only focused on administrative and physical reconstruction processes, while they did not 
identify inter-group civic engagement among communities as a side agenda. Therefore, 
this aspect of reconstruction was part of the agenda. As a result, the engagement among 
people in the fourth reconstruction happened not by plan, but naturally by the encounters 
of the people through the stakeholder forum. Inclusivity of the process in the fourth 
reconstruction helped all stakeholders get involved in the reconstruction process. Even 
though there were representatives of the people in the communication with the 
government, the weekly meetings made the process more inclusive because all 
stakeholders could attend the meetings. Direct meetings and inclusive processes impacted 
inter-group civic engagement, even if it was at minimum levels.  
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Table 6: The horizontal civic engagement and peace-focused collaborative governance. 
Model  Recon I Recon II  Recon III Recon IV 
Tool  Public policy 
process   
In conflict 
period  
Public policy process 
In post-conflict period 
 
Process  Top down  Two-ways 
communication  
Two-ways 
communication 
Stakeholders 
forum, formal and 
structured 
Stakeholder 
Relations  
Exclusive,  
No direct 
contact, 
minim 
intergroup 
engagement 
Inclusive,  
No direct 
contact (people-
the government) 
Minimum 
intergroup 
engagement  
Inclusive,  
No direct 
contact (people-
the government) 
Minimum 
intergroup 
engagement 
Direct contact, 
inclusive. Inter-
group engagement. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Indonesia has a long history of religious and ethnic conflict, and in some post-
conflict areas, communities remain segregated along the line of religion and ethnicity 
Even though conflict incidents are decreasing and peace-building is an ongoing process, 
the peace in those areas is still fragile and can easily relapse into violent conflict. One of 
the factors that contributes to the possibility of violent conflict erupting again is the social 
segregation that leads to mistrust among different communities. This study looks at civic 
engagement as a method to minimize social segregation among communities in post-
conflict areas through involving people in public policy processes with collaborative 
governance approaches. Through this study, the collaborative governance approach can 
be considered as an alternative and viable strategy for addressing the problems of 
segregated societies in post-conflict areas. 
From this case study of public policy processes in post-conflict Ambon, the 
involvement of people in public policy processes is affected by the changing of the 
conflict circumstances. During the period of conflict, people’s participation in public 
policy processes was relatively low because of emergency conditions, poor security, and 
the priority of more basic issues than participation in the government policy-making and 
implementation. In the post-conflict era, however, government and governmental 
agencies were operating with the faulty belief that victims of conflict do not have the 
capacity to participate in collective solution building, but simply need help. This study 
indicates that in post-conflict Ambon, Indonesia, stability and healing occurred only 
when citizens because actively involved in public policy processes.  
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The post-conflict situation provided more opportunities for civic participation in 
the public policy process, because the priority issues evident during the period of conflict 
are less prominent, and people start to criticize public policy decisions –– especially as 
they directly relate to their interests. However, the presence of conflict is not a legitimate 
reason for the government to ignore the importance of civil participation in the public 
policy process. The governments have to find the strategies in the pubic policy process 
that still give space for civic involvement. From the Waringin’s reconstruction processes, 
changing the government strategies from an exclusively reconstruction approach to a 
renovation/reconstruction approach, improved the communication and relationships 
between the government and people, and as a result, created more opportunities to 
involve people in the public policy process.  
Involving people in the process of public policy decision-making and 
implementation requires support beyond that of the internal government. Peace 
agreements between conflicting parties, national attention, and political will from the 
government affect the confidence of local government to apply inclusive and 
participatory approaches to public policy in post-conflict areas.  
Moreover, the role of the national and local media in covering issues of public 
policy process in post-conflict areas can stimulate people to become active in the process. 
The media can provide information about the problems at the grassroots level, share 
information about the public policy process, and make overt the linkage between the 
problem and the process. Coverage from media can also influence the government to be 
more transparent in their process.  
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The representation of people in the public policy process is important, especially 
when representatives are elected by the people. Such representation facilitates 
communication between the government and people; however, the presence of elected 
representatives does not insure effective communication between people with the 
government agencies, nor does it exclude direct communication without representation. 
The combination of representation and direct relations with the government in the public 
policy process can lead to more active engagement with the government. Public forums 
can provide further support for direct relations between people and the government.  
Two-way communication between the government and people in public policy 
processes in post-conflict areas positively impacts people’s involvement. This direction 
gives more space for people to articulate the real problems in the field, to criticize, and to 
suggest solutions for the public policy process, while it gives government opportunities 
for direct education, explanation of the process, and up-dating information from the field. 
Therefore, the two-way relationship will minimize misunderstanding, improve decision 
making and policy implementation, and increase trust and the sense of ownership of the 
process.  
From the study, it took more than one decade in Ambon City to improve the 
public policy process to include more civic participation. The government and people 
learned from the practice of public policy processes before, then improved and changed 
the process after that. This long period might be shortened when the government and the 
people know, understand, and have greater skill in employing collaborative governance 
approaches.  
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This study focuses on the nature of the aftermath of horizontal and ethnic conflict 
as a common post-conflict situation in Indonesia. One of the characteristics of horizontal 
conflict is that the government is not part of the conflict, which happens between ethnic 
or religious communities. In this situation, the position of the government is relatively 
neutral or considered neutral by the people. The study indicates that it is possible to apply 
collaborative governance approaches in post-conflict circumstances when the government 
is relatively neutral or considered neutral by the conflicting parties. When the 
government acts as a neutral among conflicting parties, it increases people’s trust in the 
government’s ability to conduct fair and representative public policy processes. This 
sense of trust stimulates civic participation, which is fundamental of collaborative 
governance process. A neutral stakeholder forum, conducted by the government, is one 
approach that can help develop collaborative governance processes in a post-conflict 
area.    
According to my case study, segregated people in post-(horizontal) conflict areas, 
are often ready for involvement in public policy processes and collaborative governance 
approaches. Their experiences of suffering from the conflict make them very interested in 
the development of critical public policies, because they understand that every public 
policy will directly or indirectly affect their lives. The Waringin reconstruction processes 
showed that people were always enthusiastic to be involved in the process. People wanted 
direct communication with the government in the conflict and post-conflict situation in 
order to get sure and trusted information. In contrast, the biggest stumbling block for 
involving people in the process is the government agencies. The government prefers to 
communicate with the representatives of the people rather that direct communication with 
	   100 
the people, indicating that government and government agencies might not be as ready 
for collaborative governance processes.  
In general, this study observed that civic participation in public policy in the post-
conflict areas depends on the government strategies in choosing the processes and 
building stakeholders relation. Since civic participation is one of the fundamental 
requirements in collaborative governance, the high level of civic participation in this 
post-conflict case shows that the practice of collaborative governance in post-conflict 
areas is really possible.   
Public policy processes in post-conflict Ambon were changing gradually toward 
involving people in the processes. However, the increased involvement did not 
automatically increase inter-group civic engagement among different communities in 
Ambon City. The government focused on the involvement of people in the decision 
making process rather than using the process also as an instrument for decreasing social 
segregation. The government has not intended to use public policy process as a way to 
stimulate inter-group civic engagement.  
The processes in Ambon partly achieved the diagonal civic engagement and 
peace-concerned collaborative governance model. However, some effort remains to make 
sure that the process uses a neutral forum, formal and structured and inclusive, to 
facilitate direct contact and inter-group engagement to build inter-group relations.  
There are some suggestions that arise from this study in order to achieve greater 
diagonal civic engagement and peace-concerned of collaborative governance in post-
conflict areas.  The first, proactive involvement of people in the public policy process has 
to encourage inter-group civic engagement between communities. Therefore, from the 
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first process, the government and the government agencies have to be aware and use 
public policy process as also an alternative instrument for building inter-group civic 
engagement rather than only engagement of people with the government.  
In order to get the level of awareness for government using collaborative 
governance approaches to promote inter-community relationship-building, the agencies 
need knowledge and skill in applying collaborative governance approaches. Therefore, 
the training of collaborative governance is important especially for the government 
agencies in post-conflict areas.  
The practice of collaborative governance has to be put in the frame as part of the 
peace-building process in order to sustain peace in post-conflict areas. Conflict sensitivity 
is an important part to make sure that the collaborative governance approaches support 
and walk hand-and-hand with the peace-building process. Therefore, peace-concerned 
collaborative governance and diagonal civic engagement can be a model of the 
collaborative governance practice in post-conflict areas.  
Because the practice of collaborative governance in post-conflict areas can 
support the peace-building process, national and international NGOs who work in post-
conflict areas have to think of new strategies for using collaborative governance. As a 
result, they have to include collaborative governance in materials of conflict resolution or 
peace-building trainings in post-conflict areas. In order to make sure that collaborative 
governance can apply in post-conflict areas, the role of media has to be recognized as 
significant in the collaborative governance process. Therefore, training on collaborative 
governance also has to be provided to journalists as a part of the peace journalism 
activities.   
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Recommendations for the Future 
 
This study is meant to introduce the way in which collaborative governance can 
be utilized in post-conflict society, and to encourage further exploration of collaborative 
governance as a peace building processes. The following are recommendations provide 
some suggested next steps for central government and local government representatives, 
with particular considerations to those governmental bodies in Indonesia, who wish to 
engage collaborative governance processes.  
The first step toward building collaborative governance is to publicize the form and 
functions of it, and educate Indonesian government officials and regular citizens about 
the collaborative governance approach to public policy. This public education campaign 
can be accomplished through publications, and research conducted by mass media, public 
discussions, as well as seminars and symposia. This education campaign can be 
combined with trainings and workshop about collaborative governance –– especially for 
government agencies, mass media, NGOs, and academicians. The training will help 
participants acquire both knowledge and skills about effectively applying collaborative 
governance. This will help shift the paradigm of leadership in government agencies, 
which will create more space for people to get involved in public policy processes. 
The second step is to create pilot projects in areas that have the biggest likelihood 
of successfully applying collaborative governance.  For example, pilot project sites 
should have government that is perceived as neutral, and the best-case scenario is to 
locate a neutral and trustworthy organization or institution that could serve as a 
collaborative governance resource center to support the educational process, to help 
spread the collaborative governance approach, and to pioneer the pilot project.  
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The lessons learned in the course of the pilot project(s) can be published as part of 
spreading enthusiasm for the collaborative governance process, and also as part of the 
process of educating Indonesian government officials and regular citizens. The process of 
public comment, criticism and public debate about collaborative governance can help 
shape a unique collaborative governance approach that fits in Indonesia.  
The final step in the process is to use the learning from the pilot projects to 
expand collaborative governance in all areas in Indonesia. Once there is greater 
familiarity with the process, and a deeper understanding of how it can benefit an 
emerging democracy, such as that within Indonesia, more and more areas will support its 
implementation. In addition, any international or national funding that is linked to the 
development and implementation of collaborative governance could serve as a 
motivational factor, as could laws or policies that provide a structure to apply 
collaborative governance throughout Indonesia. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is an exciting time to imagine how collaborative governance could contribute to 
the general task of democracy building in Indonesia and, more specifically, how it could 
lend stability to peace building process in post-conflict societies. This thesis provides a 
strong foundational argument for the importance of this approach, and has recommended 
a course of action intended to build a greater understanding about collaborative 
governance, and ideally, some concrete steps for getting traction in Indonesia. My hope is 
that this research will prompt deep considerations, and inspire dynamic conversations that 
will secure a successful and peaceful future for Indonesia.  
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